What just happened in the stock market?

Posted by Cam Hui -

Preface: Explaining our market timing models
We maintain several market timing models, each with differing time horizons. The “Ultimate Market Timing Model” is a long-term market timing model based on the research outlined in our post, Building the ultimate market timing model. This model tends to generate only a handful of signals each decade.

The Trend Model is an asset allocation model which applies trend following principles based on the inputs of global stock and commodity price. This model has a shorter time horizon and tends to turn over about 4-6 times a year. In essence, it seeks to answer the question, “Is the trend in the global economy expansion (bullish) or contraction (bearish)?”

My inner trader uses a trading model, which is a blend of price momentum (is the Trend Model becoming more bullish, or bearish?) and overbought/oversold extremes (don’t buy if the trend is overbought, and vice versa). Subscribers receive real-time alerts of model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts are updated weekly here. The hypothetical trading record of the trading model of the real-time alerts that began in March 2016 is shown below.
 

 

The latest signals of each model are as follows:

  • Ultimate market timing model: Sell equities
  • Trend Model signal: Bearish
  • Trading model: Bullish

Update schedule: I generally update model readings on my site on weekends and tweet mid-week observations at @humblestudent. Subscribers receive real-time alerts of trading model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts is shown here.
 

What is the market discounting?

The velocity and ferociousness of the recent US equity market weakness caught even bears like me by surprise. My social media feed has been filled with extreme bearishness. Opinions are now becoming bifurcated. Either the decline is the signal of something big, or the fall in stock prices represent a buying opportunity for fundamentally oriented investors.

It is impossible to make a buy, hold, or sell decision without some understanding of what the market is discounting. In other words, what bet are you making if you decide to buy or sell stocks here?

Further analysis reveals that investors are discounting only a mild US slowdown in 1H 2019, but no recession. From a technical perspective, both the US and global markets have violated well-defined uptrend lines, just as they did in 2015 and 2007. It remains an open question as to whether the trend line breakdowns will result in just a mild pullback, or a deeper bear market. (Please note that the curves and arrows drawn on the charts are only stylized, and do not represent technical projections or targets).
 

 

A slowdown ahead

There are plenty of signs that growth is decelerating, which both Ed Yardeni and Urban Carmel were prescient enough to warn about. My set of long leading indicators, which are designed to spot recessions a year in advance, began to deteriorate last summer and now stands at a near-recession reading. The deteriorating is becoming evident in growth expectations, as GDP growth is expected to slow from the torrid 3-4% annualized rate to about a 2% pace in 2019.
 

 

The transportation sector is a highly cyclical sector and represents a short leading indicator of economic growth. The recent FedEx (FDX) earnings report was disturbing, as the company stated “global growth has slowed but we are very surprised by the magnitude of the headwind, which is what might be seen in a severe recession”. The price performance of FDX and the DJ Transports has historically led GDP growth by roughly six months, and they are pointing to a sharp deceleration in economic growth. However, I would not characterize the decline to be severe enough to declare a recession (yet).
 

 

In addition, the latest update from FactSet shows forward EPS estimate revisions have been flattening, which is another indication of diminished growth expectations from Wall Street.
 

 

No recession expected

How has the market responded to these signals? The latest BAML Fund Manager Survey was highly revealing. Institutional managers overwhelming rejected the idea of a global recession in 2019 (top panel), but expected growth to decelerate (bottom panel). In other words, they only expect a slowdown.
 

 

What are they doing with their equity allocation? Last week, I highlighted analysis from Kevin Muir of The Macro Tourist, who believed that managers were in a crowded long in USD assets, including equities. As US growth slows in early 2019, managers will begin to normalize their overweight position in US equities. That is precisely what is the Fund Manager Survey is telling us. Instead, managers are re-allocating their weights to the high beta EM equities, which is consistent with the view that the world would avoid a 2019 recession.
 

 

The relative performance of US, EAFE, or developed non-US markets, and EM equities relative to the MSCI All-Country World Index (ACWI) tells the same story. US stocks have been range bound on a relative basis since August and they have begun to break down only recently. Instead, EM equities are gaining relative strength.

In other words, both the survey data and real-time performance data reflect the view that the market expects a US growth deceleration, but no global recession. Otherwise investors would not be buying the high-beta and high risk EM sectors, no matter how beaten up and cheap they seem.
 

 

The financial cycle vs. business cycle

One key risk to the outlook comes from a deteriorating financial cycle. A recent BIS paper, “The Financial Cycle and Recession Risk”, made a distinction between the business cycle, whose analysis is well captured using my long leading indicators, and the financial cycle.

Financial cycle booms can end in crises and, even if they do not, they tend to weaken growth. Given their slow build-up, do they convey information about recession risk? We compare the predictive performance of different financial cycle proxies with that of the term spread – a popular recession indicator. In contrast to much of the literature, our analysis covers a large sample of advanced and emerging market economies. We find that, in general, financial cycle measures provide valuable information and tend to outperform the term spread.

One of the best real-time indicators of the financial cycle is the relative market performance of bank stocks. Past technical breakdowns of bank stocks have signaled periods of financial stress, and the relative performance of regional banks (bottom panel) have shown to be an even more sensitive barometer. Bank stocks recently violated a key relative support line, which is an indication that the financial cycle is turning down.

 

As an aside, consistent with the analysis from the BIS paper, the bear market and recession that began in 2000 was not the result of financial stress, but a Tech Bubble that was not largely financed with debt. If punters had bought NASDAQ stocks on margin, the resulting downturn would have been far worse.

The usefulness of the relative performance of US bank stocks is their correlation of the relative performance of European banks. The relative performance effect appears to be global, with the exception of selected localized events such as the recent US tax cut effect on financials. This is an indication that bank stocks are capturing the global financial cycle.
 

 

Where are the stresses in the financial system? They don’t seem to be emanating from the US. Financial conditions have deteriorated, but they don’t appear to be out of control.
 

 

Yield spreads have widened, but readings are not levels seen before the last recessions.
 

 

In this cycle, the financial risk originate outside the US. For one, Europe never fixed its banking leverage problems from its last cycle.
 

 

John Authers at Bloomberg recently cited USD liquidity as a possible problem for eurozone banks:

Meanwhile, the agonies for banks in the euro zone grow ever worse. The new reason for their problems, which have happened even though the European Central Bank, unlike the Fed, is still engaged in QE, seems to be a shortage of dollars. This is partly because of the Fed, but also possibly in part because of another signature U.S. policy. The tax reform package passed a year ago provided for the repatriation of foreign U.S. corporate subsidiaries’ earnings. Previously, those earnings sat in the accounts of foreign banks, providing a supply of dollars. Now that the big and successful U.S. tech groups are no longer leaving large piles of cash in Europe, the problems for Europe’s over-bloated and inefficient banking system have grown much more acute

Indeed, offshore USD liquidity is tightening, and has the potential to put downward pressure on equity prices.
 

 

And who can forget the debt building in China.
 

 

The Chinese economy is already slowing. The SCMP reported that unemployment is rising as the trade war is starting to bite. This will handcuff China’s maneuvering room in its trade negotiations with the US as Beijing has historically put a heavy policy weight on employment and social stability.

Beijing is now officially worried about unemployment, as the US-China trade war continues to weigh on the world’s second largest economy.

On Wednesday, the State Council unveiled policies ranging from refunding unemployment insurance payments to companies that do not lay off staff to giving subsidies to jobless young people aged 16 to 24 rather than only to college graduates without jobs, according to a document on the government’s website.

The cabinet’s policy paper, which was drafted on November 16 but only made public this week, had already been passed down to local governments last month. The local governments were told to draft their own versions, taking account of local conditions, within 30 days.

Beijing has prioritised employment stability over other economic targets in various meetings, but the document offers the first sign of unease within the central government leadership over whether it can fight off unemployment pressure, as the trade war continues to reduce corporate hiring demand, particularly from export manufacturers.

Reuters report that China plans a stimulus package to support growth:

China will ratchet up support for the economy in 2019 by cutting taxes and keeping liquidity ample, the official Xinhua news agency said following an annual meeting of top leaders amid a trade dispute with the United States.

The government has launched a raft of measures, including reductions in reserve requirements for banks, tax cuts and more infrastructure spending, to ward off a sharp deceleration in the world’s second-largest economy. Further policy steps are expected.

Another round of stimulus is unlikely to have similar effects as past packages. If the stimulus is purely fiscal in nature, investors are likely to be disappointed with the magnitude of the effect. If the stimulus is credit driven, John Authers pointed out that credit impulses are growing less and less effective as a way to boost growth.
 

 

Then there is the trade war. The most benign outcome would see Trump extract minor concessions from Beijing and declare victory. Another possible bullish scenario would involve Trump, under pressure from declining stock prices, continue to negotiate but delay the implementation of the next round of tariffs.

Regardless of how the trade dispute will be resolved in the near-term, trade frictions are unlikely to go away. Leland Miller of China Beige Book recently made the point on CNBC that there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that trade with China is a big problem. Miller expects trade tensions to ramp up in the runup to the 2020 election, as both sides will try to position themselves as being “tough on China”.
 

Assessing the bull and bear cases

How will these risks resolve themselves? Unfortunately, my time machine is in the shop getting fixed and I don’t have a definitive answer.

Conventional macro business cycle models indicate that while recession risks are rising, but readings are not high enough to make a recession call for late 2019 or early 2020. I can therefore make the case that the American economy slows in 2019, but avoids a recession. In that case, the current market carnage represents a buying opportunity. New Deal democrat‘s long leading indicators have been bouncing around but readings are neutral, indicating no recession ahead. He warned against projecting the deterioration of model readings into the future to make a recession call:

The long leading indicators remained neutral again this week. The nowcast remained positive. The short-term forecast a weaker positive, Although there were no rating changes, stocks, commodities, the regional Fed new orders indexes, and the US dollar all turned less positive or more negative.

I want to add a note this week that I think people are getting ahead of themselves, projecting weak trends to weaken even further, and assuming that means recession. It has struck me this week how in many ways the current situation reminds me of year-end 1994. Alan Greenspan was aggressively raising rates in the face of non-existent inflation. Sentiment turned awful, and portions of the yield curve briefly inverted. And then … it didn’t happen. There was a big slowdown in 1995 followed by a big rebound. I’m not on recession watch now, and I won’t go on recession watch unless and until the broad range of data justifies it.

Indeed, the latest update from Open Insider shows that this group of “smart investors” are buying the dip.
 

 

On the other hand, global recession risks are rising. While correlation is not causation, but German manufacturing and Chinese industrial activity. Further Chinese weakness could see financial contagion effects leak into the European banking system.
 

 

From a technical perspective, I would look for conditions when the market stops responding to bad news. One example can be found during the eurozone and Greek Crisis of 2011. During the summer of 2011, the eurozone was at risk of breaking apart, and European leaders were having almost weekly summits on how to solve the problem. At times, it seemed that Europe was leaderless, and no one was in charge. The crisis lifted after the ECB unveiled its LTRO program to backstop the banking system in order to buy time for member states to engage in structural reform. Some time during that process, the market stopped falling on bad news.
 

 

We have not arrived at that point yet. The market response to the FOMC decision shows that the market had unrealistically high expectations for Fed policy.

In addition, % Bears from the Investors Intelligence survey (blue line) edged up last week but remains stubbornly low. The latest survey was done early in the week, when the market was already tanking. Ideally, I would like to see % Bears exceed % Bulls as the sign of capitulation. The lack of a spike in II Bears is an indication that long-term sentiment is insufficiently washed-out for a long-term bottom.
 

 

My recommendation is to monitor the evolution of financial risk, as well as the evolution of investor psychology in order to determine the timing of a market bottom. My inner fundamental and macro analyst is keeping an open mind as to the possible outcomes. My inner technician believes that this is the first leg down of a deeper bear market.
 

The short-term outlook

Looking ahead to the next few week, to say that the market is oversold is an understatement as readings are now at off-the-charts levels. The CBOE put/call ratio (CPC) reached 1.82 last Thursday, which is the highest level in its history since 1995. A historical study shows past SPY returns when CPC 5 dma crosses above 1.24 for 1st time in a month, n=13 since 1995. 92% closed higher within 5 days with average return of 2.5%.
 

 

The Zweig Breadth Thrust Indicator is also oversold, and readings are comparable to levels seen at the panic selloffs in 2008 and 2011.
 

 

The NYSE McClellan Summation Index (NYSI) has reached the oversold levels seen at previous major bear markets. The good news is the positive divergence on stochastics (bottom panel).
 

 

The % Bullish indicator is also in blind panic territory.
 

 

One reader likened the panic as “hanging on a horse running in a burning barn”. The following observation from SentimenTrader is just one of many examples of this panic.
 

 

Conditions are more than ripe for a relief rally. That said, some caution is warranted. Urban Carmel pointed out that while the market has historically seen a bounce under similar conditions, but the market has re-tested the lows soon afterwards (see red arrows).
 

 

My inner investor interprets these conditions as the signs of an intermediate term bear market. He de-risked his portfolio in September and he is glad he missed the carnage.

My inner trader was caught long, and he is hanging on to play the bounce. When the rally comes, he is watching short-term breadth for an overbought condition to short into for the likely re-test of the previous lows. Volatility will be treacherous. Adjust your position sizes in accordance to your risk tolerance.
 

 

I have received a number of words of encouragement on the record of the trading model this year. The latest drawdown is a shock and disappointment. I will write a full analysis of the trading model in the near future.

Seasons Greetings and happy holidays to all.

Disclosure: Long SPXL
 

A bloodbath on Wall Street

Posted by Cam Hui -

Mid-week market update: I had expected to begin to wind down and relax for the holidays this time of year. Instead, we got a bloodbath in the stock market.

To say that the market is oversold is an understatement. Sure, standard measures indicate oversold conditions, such as the VIX Index had risen above its upper Bollinger Band. Interestingly, the VIX Index failed to rise today despite the carnage in the stock market, which could be a sign of hope for equity bulls.

 

The Fear and Greed Index is also showing extreme conditions.

 

Oversold markets can become more oversold. How oversold? This report from UBS puts the velocity of the sell-off into context.

 

Here is the full chart from UBS:

 

Rebound ahead?

Here is what happened next. Out of the 14 instances, 8 of the following years saw very positive returns of +12% to +44% while 6 saw very negative returns.

 

SentimenTrader also found that returns in the following quarter tends to be positive, though it is difficult to generalize with such a small sample size.

 

In other words, expect fat-tailed performance in the coming year. For what it’s worth, the stock market weakness created a Zweig Breadth Thrust oversold condition, which is a setup for a possible ZBT buy signal. Should the market rebound sufficiently to achieve a breadth thrust in the 10 trading days after the recovery from the oversold condition, it would generate a rare ZBT buy signal indicating positive momentum. Even without a ZBT buy signal, such oversold conditions can be useful signals of a market that is stretched to the downside.

 

My inner investor has de-risked his portfolio, but my inner trader remains bullishly positioned in anticipation of a relief rally, but he is feeling the pain and getting very nervous.

Disclosure: Long SPXL

 

How China and America could both lose Cold War 2.0

Posted by Cam Hui -

In a past post (see Pax Americana or America First?), I showed how the combination of the unequal sharing of productivity gains and the inward looking America First policies were eroding US competitiveness, and raising the fragility of the post-WW II Pax Americana boom.

Even though the US and China appears to be locked into a Cold War 2.0, I would like to demonstrate how both countries appear to be locked into paths that will eventually stall their growth.

Andy Haldane’s about face

We begin the story with the Bank of England’s chief economist Andy Haldane, who recently made a remarkable speech to some students at Oxford. Haldane said that he had changed his mind about the drivers of economic growth:

I thought I understood the story of economic growth, its drivers and determinants. But recently I have changed my mind. I have a new story of growth. I think this story carries important implications for understanding the future challenges of technology and for devising the future policies and institutions necessary to meet them. That might require, among other things, a repurposing of successful institutions like this one, turning them from universities into multiversities.

The old neoclassical models weren’t good enough:

In the second half of the 18th century in the UK, ideas began sprouting like morning mushrooms. These ideas emerged seemingly spontaneously and roughly contemporaneously. They were also relatively closely clustered geographically. They included James Hargreaves’ spinning jenny in 1764, Richard Arkwright’s water frame in 1769 and James Watt’s steam engine in 1775.

In the fullness of time, these ideas began to revolutionise both industry and work. After a lengthy adoption lag, they spread across sectors and across regions. They migrated from being mere ideas to becoming “GPTs” or General Purpose Technologies.12 In the process, they generated waves of investment in new factories, machines, processes and infrastructures. There was, in the jargon, capital-deepening.

Neo-Classical theories of economic growth are very clear what would be expected to happen next.13 When an outward shift in the economy’s technological frontier is combined with higher levels of physical capital, the fuse is lit on higher productivity among companies, higher wages among workers and, ultimately, higher living standards among societies. So it was during the Golden Era.

Chart 2 plots productivity, wages and GDP per head in the UK since the Industrial Revolution. All three plateaued prior to 1750. Since then, all three have moved up in lockstep. Ideas and innovation have borne continuous fruit in higher productivity, pay and living standards. This fruit has been shared roughly equally between owners of companies (profits) and workers in companies (wages). We know that because labour’s share of the national income pie is similar today to 1750.

 

Here is the problem with those models. Why did other waves of innovation fail to transform societies?

You do not need to go that far back for examples of big ideas which had a transformative impact on industry and society. Immediately prior to the Industrial Revolution and running chronologically, these included the windmill in the 12th century, the mechanical clock in the 13th, the cannon in the 14th, the printing press in the 15th, the postal service in the 16th and the telescope and microscope in the 17th.

It will surprise no-one that waves of innovation, big and small, have been lapping the shores of society for the entirety of human civilisation. In other words, while ideas and innovation may well be a necessary condition for economic growth, the historical record suggests they may not themselves have been sufficient. Other forces appear to have been at play, translating these ideas into sustained growth in living standards.

Haldane came up with two ideas:

What might those forces be? I want to provide two different, but complementary, lenses on the growth story. The first focusses on a rather broader set of “capitals” – not just physical capital (plant and machines) but human (skills and expertise), intellectual (ideas and technologies), infrastructural (transport and legal systems), social (co-operation and trust) and institutional (national and civic, private and public) capital.

History suggests each of these capitals may have played an important supporting role in the story of growth. Ideas alone, without the support of one or more of these broader capitals, have historically run aground. For example, in the UK many of the foundations for growth after the Industrial Revolution were laid in the centuries preceding it. It was on this platform of “capitals”, plural, that ideas and innovation then built.

Take human capital. The most dramatic improvements in educational standards in the UK occurred prior to 1750 (Chart 3). So too did the largest improvements in measures of social, infrastructural and institutional capital.19 Ideas needed these foundations to flourish. A steam engine is not much use without the skills to build it, the tracks to run it on, the institutions to oversee it, the trust of the public to accept it. The causes of the growth inflexion in 18th century England were as much sociological as technological.

The other revolutionary idea came from an important paper by Broadberry and Wallis, whose conclusion was “don’t lose when you’re in a recession”:

Another lens through which to view this alternative growth story has recently been provided by economic historians, Steve Broadberry and John Wallis.20 Indeed it was probably this lens on the world, above all others, that led me to change my own story about growth.

FT Alphaville explained the Broadberry and Wallis paper this way. Innovation and the conditions for innovation are critical to growth, but institutions are just as important:

In a 2017 paper for the National Bureau of Economic Research, they collected growth data for several European countries back to the 14th century. They had noticed that poorer countries go through more frequent contractions. In other words, they shrink a lot. So Broadberry and Wallis decided to quantify not just periods of growth, but periods of shrinkage. They found the countries that began sprinting in the 19th century didn’t grow faster. They just shrank less often.

When economies start to grow fast, says Wallis, “80 per cent of the increase in growth rate can be explained by shrinking rather than growing.” It was his idea to look at shrinking, and he was surprised by how important it ended up being. That Solow-Swan story of how to grow isn’t enough on its own. It needs a complement, the story of how not to shrink. Broadberry and Wallis point to what economists call “institutions” — customs and laws that create order and make regular transactions even possible.

To grow, it’s not enough to provide labour, capital and ideas. You have to be able to co-ordinate exchange, to trust that when you extend credit, your counterparty will be there, and the plant you just bought won’t be arbitrarily seized by the government. In the post-colonial United States, for example, it was impossible to charter a bank in many states unless you were a patron of the right political party. Getting rid of that — moving towards equal treatment under the law — was as important to the American industrial revolution as the capitalisation of the mills in Lowell, Massachusetts.

Institutions prevent countries from shrinking, because they provide a baseline guarantee of economic co-ordination. They create trust, which makes growth less fragile. (Though Wallis avoids the word “trust,” which he finds too morally loaded.) Countries that fail to develop institutions fail to become rich countries:

 

The fading American Dream

To summarize, the conditions for growth are the following:

  • Create the conditions for innovation and their exploitation
  • Create the institutions to foster growth

That sounds like the American Dream, where anybody can make it, where if you build a better mousetrap the world will beat a path to your door.

Here is the actual data. Alan Krueger, who was Obama’s chairman’s of the Council of Economic Advisors, called it the Great Gatsby Curve. Krueger studied the connection between concentration of wealth in one generation and the ability of those in the next generation to move up the economic ladder compared to their parents.

 

Here is an updated version of that data that include EM economies. At the top of the list is China. The US is just behind developed markets in the UK and Italy. The American Dream is alive, but in the “socialist” Scandinavian countries, as well as former British colonies Australia and Canada.

 

We have all heard about the stories of nepotism and cronyism in China. Many Politburo are princelings, or the sons of former revolutionaries. The SCMP recently reported that the deputy Communist Party chief in Shenzhen had 1 billion yuan in cash that money launderers refused to touch. If we were to focus on the other tail of the income distribution, China tops the world in child poverty rates, while the Scandinavians rank at the bottom.

 

What about the US? The Financial Analysts Journal recently published an article entitled “Corporate Political Strategies and Return Predictability”. Here is the abstract [emphasis added]:

We assess whether observable corporate political strategies can serve as channels of value-relevant political information flow into stock prices and form the basis for profitable return predictability strategies. We document that returns of politically connected firms’ stocks lead those of their non-connected peers, suggesting that information shocks associated with new policies and other political developments become evident first in the stock prices of firms that pursue political strategies and then, with delay, in those of similar, non-connected firms.

Former IMF chief economist Simon Johnson discussed the response to the Great Financial Crisis and other EM crises in The Atlantic:

To IMF officials, all of these crises looked depressingly similar. Each country, of course, needed a loan, but more than that, each needed to make big changes so that the loan could really work. Almost always, countries in crisis need to learn to live within their means after a period of excess—exports must be increased, and imports cut—and the goal is to do this without the most horrible of recessions. Naturally, the fund’s economists spend time figuring out the policies—budget, money supply, and the like—that make sense in this context. Yet the economic solution is seldom very hard to work out…

Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks. Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a tight-knit—and, most of the time, genteel—oligarchy, running the country rather like a profit-seeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders…

Squeezing the oligarchs, though, is seldom the strategy of choice among emerging-market governments. Quite the contrary: at the outset of the crisis, the oligarchs are usually among the first to get extra help from the government, such as preferential access to foreign currency, or maybe a nice tax break, or—here’s a classic Kremlin bailout technique—the assumption of private debt obligations by the government. Under duress, generosity toward old friends takes many innovative forms. Meanwhile, needing to squeeze someone, most emerging-market governments look first to ordinary working folk—at least until the riots grow too large.

That’s why institutions matter. Innovation matters, but institutions create the equality of opportunity, though the equality of results is not necessarily an objective. The situation has deteriorated sufficiently that even Barron’s (!) has called for a bigger welfare state:

Life is filled with risks, and most of them skew to the downside: losing a job or getting hit by a car is much likelier than winning the lottery. While private insurance and ample savings can help, those who are most vulnerable to sudden drops in earnings or unexpected expenses are often the people least able to afford these protections.

The inequality gap has opened up not just among individual Americans, but at the community level, as this Brookings study concluded:

The 2016 election revealed a dramatic gap between two Americas—one based in large, diverse, thriving metropolitan regions; the other found in more homogeneous small towns and rural areas struggling under the weight of economic stagnation and social decline.

 

Here is another remarkable observation. Dollar stores now feed more Americans than Whole Foods, even though most of them don’t sell fresh food. The number of dollar stores in America now outnumber McDonald’s and WalMart stores.

 

Another sign of fragility can be found in the divergence in life expectancy between Americans and other western developed economies.

 

As the Broadberry and Wallis paper showed, you win by not shrinking. Corruption, inequality, and weakening institutions raise economic fragility. The Chinese boom is fragile. In America, the weakening of institutions did not begin with Trump, but the populism manifested by Trump is just another symptom of that fragility.

How the bear market could end

Posted by Cam Hui -

Preface: Explaining our market timing models
We maintain several market timing models, each with differing time horizons. The “Ultimate Market Timing Model” is a long-term market timing model based on the research outlined in our post, Building the ultimate market timing model. This model tends to generate only a handful of signals each decade.

The Trend Model is an asset allocation model which applies trend following principles based on the inputs of global stock and commodity price. This model has a shorter time horizon and tends to turn over about 4-6 times a year. In essence, it seeks to answer the question, “Is the trend in the global economy expansion (bullish) or contraction (bearish)?”
 

 

My inner trader uses the trading component of the Trend Model to look for changes in the direction of the main Trend Model signal. A bullish Trend Model signal that gets less bullish is a trading “sell” signal. Conversely, a bearish Trend Model signal that gets less bearish is a trading “buy” signal. The history of actual out-of-sample (not backtested) signals of the trading model are shown by the arrows in the chart below. The turnover rate of the trading model is high, and it has varied between 150% to 200% per month.

Subscribers receive real-time alerts of model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts are updated weekly here. The hypothetical trading record of the trading model of the real-time alerts that began in March 2016 is shown below.
 

 

The latest signals of each model are as follows:

  • Ultimate market timing model: Sell equities
  • Trend Model signal: Bearish
  • Trading model: Bullish

Update schedule: I generally update model readings on my site on weekends and tweet mid-week observations at @humblestudent. Subscribers receive real-time alerts of trading model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts is shown here.
 

What happens after the sell signal?

Last week’s publication generated much discussion (see A bear market is now underway). Some of the questions related to the duration and downside target in a bear market. How far can stocks fall? How long will it last? What might be the trigger for a buy signal?

To reiterate my thesis from last week. Poor technical action and a recession forecast for late 2019 or early 2020 prompted the equity sell signal. The recession forecast stems from the combination of near-recession conditions based on conventional US macro indicators, evidence of global weakness in both Europe and China, and the near certainty of a trade war which would further tank global growth.

What might turn this bear thesis around, or put a halt to the bear market? Here are a couple of possible fundamental triggers:

  • An end to the trade war
  • More stimulus underpinned by the ascendancy of MMT in fiscal policy circles

 

The bear market scenario

My base case scenario for the bear market goes something like this. Kevin Muir at The Macro Tourist recently made the case that global investors had been piling into US assets, and the recent strength of the American economy created a positive feedback loop. As more managers bought US equities, they pushed up the USD exchange rate, which resulted in positive momentum and further pushed up the USD and US equity prices. That trade is over, and they are now in a crowded long.

The latest BAML Fund Manager Survey confirms those observations. Global managers believe that the US has the best growth potential of all the regions around the world.
 

 

Managers are overweight US equities, while either market or underweight every other region in the world.
 

 

The US as safe haven growth trade is now running out of steam. The relative performance of US stocks against the MSCI All-Country World Index (ACWI) has been flat since September.
 

 

I made the case that we should start to see evidence of slowing US growth in early 2019 (see 2019 preview: Winter is coming), which would likely start to spark recession fears, and prompt global managers to reduce their overweight positions in US stocks.

How far can the market fall? While I am always “data dependent” and the trigger for a market selloff depends on the actual fundamental trigger, technical analysis can provide some clues. Based on the assumption (and this is just an assumption) that a bear market has begun, as evidenced by the MACD sell signal shown below (red line), the logical initial downside target for the SPX would be 2100, which represents the first Fibonacci retracement level of the move that began in 2009, and a key past resistance turned support level. Such a retreat would represent a peak-to-trough drawdown of 30%, which would be a relatively mild bear market by recent standards.
 

 

Here is what worries me. A 2019/2020 recession has become the consensus view. A Duke University/CFO Global Business Outlook survey reveals that 48.6% of CFOs expect one by the end of 2019, and 82% expect a recession by the end of 2020. Many institutions have already begun to de-risk in anticipation of a downturn. What might derail my bearish thesis?
 

Peace in our time?

A peace accord in the Sino-American trade war could be enough to spark a market rally. While the US economy would continue to slow, the psychological and economic effects of ending protectionist practices might be enough to change what might have been a global recession into a just a mild downturn. It has the potential to become the equivalent of the ECB’s implementation of the LTRO program that put an end to the Greek Crisis of 2011.

Currently, the American side is sending mixed signals. There is some debate as to arrest in the Huawei Affair was just unfortunate timing, or a deliberate signal to the Chinese. In addition, the SCMP reported that the US is proposing further restrictions on the transfer of technology to China, particular in the areas of AI and biotech:

The US on Monday proposed new export restrictions on additional technology sectors considered crucial to national security, furthering the Trump administration’s campaign to crack down on intellectual property theft by foreign nations including China.

In a posting in the Federal Register, the Department of Commerce identified 14 categories of new technologies – among them biotech, artificial intelligence and machine learning, data analytics and robotics – about to be subject to limits on investments by foreign entities.

“This proposed set of rules can potentially be a major change in the tech business,” said Richard Matheny III, a lawyer with the global trade group at the Goodwin Procter law firm in Washington.

“Many biotech companies, for example, that historically haven’t been subject to such controls will need to consider these restrictions, including when taking investments, collaborating with non-US persons on technology development, and exporting products.”

These measures will be interpreted as a direct attack on China’s development strategy, intended to retard China’s future growth path. Them’s fighting words.

On the other hand, Reuters reported that Trump stated in an interview he is willing to intervene in the case against Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou under the right circumstances (despite her Canadian lawyer’s statement during her bailing hearing that as much admitted that she had a role in circumventing US sanctions against Iran):

When asked if he would intervene with the Justice Department in her case, Trump said in an interview with Reuters: “Whatever’s good for this country, I would do.”

“If I think it’s good for what will be certainly the largest trade deal ever made – which is a very important thing – what’s good for national security – I would certainly intervene if I thought it was necessary,” Trump said.

At the same time, the WSJ reported that the Chinese had tabled a constructive offer with the following features:

  • Significant purchases of American LNG and soybeans (an easy step);
  • Reduction in tariffs on autos from 25% to 10%;
  • Adjustment to equity caps for foreign investments in certain sectors, which would allow foreign firms to take a majority stake in joint ventures;
  • The reduction or elimination of Chinese content rules in China 2025; and
  • Allow more foreign firms to participate in China 2025.

A key concession under consideration would be dropping the numerical targets for market share by Chinese companies, these people said. Made in China 2025 sets defined goals of raising domestic content of core components and materials to 40% by 2020 and 70% by 2025, an increase that comes at the expense of foreign competitors.

This offer represents substantial concessions, but will it be enough? The devil is in the details, and US trade representative Robert Lightizer has stated that he does not just want to see proposals, but verifiable steps that changes are being made. In other words, he is approaching the trade deal like an arms reduction treaty.

Is there a trade deal in the cards?
 

Trade negotiation analysis

Here is my take. A recent podcast interview by Axio’s Jonathan Swan’s interview with New York Times White House reporter Maggie Haberman is highly revealing about Trump’s decision-making process.

First of all, Trump keeps his views close to his vest, even to staff. He loves suspense, and can reverse his decisions on a dime. Haberman has learned not to write “Donald Trump has decided…” Here are the key excerpts from the transcript:

I’m now hedging in a way that is almost comical. So like, I recently broke the story that Trump had settled on Pat Cipollone for his White House Counsel. And when I wrote that story, I think I published it on a Saturday afternoon, I knew that Pat Cipollone … The fact I had was that Pat Cipollone had started filling out his paperwork. So I didn’t write … My lead sentence wasn’t … you know, I could pull it up now … but it wasn’t, “Donald Trump has decided …” It was, I literally wrote, “Pat Cipollone has begun filling out his paperwork for this,” because I knew that that was a fact.

The sentence, “Donald Trump has decided …” I made a big mistake early on. My story was correct. I broke the story that he was pulling out of the Paris climate deal. But I made the big mistake of saying, “Donald Trump has decided,” because, yes, he told people he decided. But then after I published my story he spoke to a White House official and he said, “What do you think I should do?”

But it doesn’t mean he hasn’t made up his mind. He’s just always polling people, even … I knew that they were scheduling the event for the next day. The speech was written. They were calling surrogates. All of these things were happening in the afternoon, so it wasn’t correct to say, “He’s on the fence.” But you need to find new language. Because there is no such thing as, “Donald Trump has decided.” It’s not a verb that you can almost use with this guy. Because he loves to create misdirection. He loves to keep flexibility open. And he loves to reverse himself. So it’s very, very challenging.

Another recent example: I broke a story that Nikki Haley was resigning as U.N. Ambassador. And I knew that it was right. I knew, I had incredibly good sourcing on it, and I knew it was happening. I still felt this little thing in my stomach when we published. I was like, “Shit, maybe this guy’s going to screw me.” You know, “Maybe he’s going to pull the rug out and say, ‘Guess what? It’s not happening. She’s U.N. Ambassador for life,’” or something. So it’s nerve-racking. And I’ve started to find ways to hedge that I would probably never do in any normal circumstance.

What about the trade war with China? She starts with analyzing the background on his accomplishments so far and what other signature initiatives are unfinished:

I think we’re at a pretty pivotal moment right now for the president. If you look in the rearview mirror, the stuff he’s accomplished is not nothing. I mean, he’s passed a big tax bill, and he’s done a ton of deregulation. He’s confirmed two Supreme Court Justices and a lot of judicial nominees. That’s all in the bucket of conventional Republican president, any other Republican president would’ve pursued those goals.

But the two goals that are definitional Trump goals, which is to change China’s behavior and to build the wall, they were two issues that defined him as a politician. He’s in a really tough spot right now. He’s kicked the can down the road on both issues. He’s signed a short-term continuing resolution to defer the shutdown fight over the wall. And he’s had this dinner with President Xi in Buenos Aires on the weekend, which resulted in, effectively, a 90-day ceasefire of this trade war and this confusing mess of competing statements that came out of both camps afterwards.

So there’s a huge TBD next to these two issues. And I find it very hard to see how he gets the money to pay for his wall. And I find it very hard to see how he gets China to do any of the really big important stuff, like change their industrial theft practices and these issues that are really, really systemic. So the question then becomes: Okay, if Trump can’t get those things done, and then he has Mueller coming down his neck, Democrats taking over the House and a blizzard of subpoenas, and a wobbly stock market, how does he respond to all of those pressures?

China is one of the key bogeymen to his political base, and Haberman doesn’t think he will back down (paragraphs in bold are questions from Jonathan Swan):

But do you expect that he has it in him to modulate some of his own behavior, or do you think it’ll be some continuation of what we have seen in recent days with the muddled messaging on China?

I don’t think he thinks it’s in his best interest to modulate. I mean, he even basically said that to us when we talked to him a few weeks ago. We said, “You keep calling the press the enemy of the people. You know that that could have consequences, that crazy people could actually …” I think Jim even said someone could die?

He did.

And Trump said, “My people like it. I go to the crowds and that’s what they like.” You take the wall as an example. There were advisers telling him, “Please talk about the economy”; Republicans on the Hill, “Please talk about the economy.” And Trump would say, “When I talk about the economy, people get bored.” They want to hear about these inflammatory issues and these really hardcore base issues.

So I don’t think he sees it in his political interest to modulate. And I expect that he would respond in the way he usually does, which is by picking a foil, which will probably be a Democrat or maybe even an establishment Republican, and hammering them in a pretty savage way; blaming others, lashing out, and creating the idea for his base that he’s fighting for them and being foiled by XYZ bogeymen.

Of course, that’s just one reporter’s opinion, but it does open a very different kind of window into Trump’s decision-making process. The market will undoubtedly oscillate between risk-on and risk-off as news on the trade negotiations hit the tape.

I am open minded about a potential deal, but remain skeptical. The most revealing market signal may come from soybean prices. Despite the news about renewed Chinese buying, soybean prices halted at key resistance level and just below its 200 dma.
 

 

The MMT recovery?

A second possible source of fundamental support for economic growth may come from the possibility of Trump and the Democrats finding some common ground to avoid a recession. As the Democrats take control of the House in 2019, it would be easy to sketch out a scenario in which House committees overwhelm the White House with investigations and subpoenas in an uncertain political environment where the Mueller has not even tabled his report.

On the other hand, both side could find some common ground. How about more government debt and spending? To be sure, the IMF has pointed out that the US is the only advanced economy that is expected to increase its debt-to-GDP ratio in the next five years. But Trump is a “debt guy”, and the Democrats have their own spending priorities, such as universal healthcare. Why not more debt-driven fiscal stimulus?
 

 

In 2019, expect more discussion about the Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), which holds that policy makers should not be too concerned over fiscal deficits as long as the debt is denominated in its own currency. Here is a defense of MMT from the Roosevelt Institute:

They insist that the notion of “fiscal sustainability” or “solvency” is not applicable to a sovereign government — which cannot be forced into involuntary default on debts denominated in its own currency. Such a government spends by crediting bank accounts or issuing paper currency. It can never run out of the “keystrokes” it uses to credit bank accounts, and so long as it can find paper and ink, it can issue paper currency. These, we believe, are simple statements that should be completely noncontroversial. And this is not a policy proposal — it is an accurate description of the spending process used by all currency-issuing sovereign governments.

And, yet, there are a number of misconceptions circulating that need to be addressed. Many (often of the Austrian persuasion) interpret this simple statement as a Leninist plot to destroy the nation’s currency by flying black helicopters dumping an infinite supply of bags of money all over the planet. This is usually accompanied by a diatribe on the evils of fiat money, with a call to return to “sound money” based on shiny yellow metal. Others suggest that we are instead proposing to ramp up the size of government, until it completes Obama’s plan to gobble up the whole economy. Almost all critiques eventually produce a lecture on the lessons to be learned from Weimar Germany and from Zimbabwe.

The strangest criticism of all is that we MMT-ers argue that “deficits do not matter”. In a recent exchange in the New York Times, Paul Krugman put it this way: “But here’s the thing: there’s a school of thought which says that deficits are never a problem, as long as a country can issue its own currency.” In that piece he took Jamie Galbraith to task for arguing that “Insolvency, bankruptcy, or even higher real interest rates are not among the actual risks” facing a sovereign government. I won’t go into the details, but Krugman produced a simple model in which ever-larger budget deficits generate ever-rising prices. You can see the rest of that back-and-forth here. But the strange thing is that Krugman never actually addressed Galbraith’s points that insolvency, bankruptcy, or higher interest rates are non-issues for a sovereign government. Nor did Krugman even try to justify his claim that MMT-ers “say that deficits are never a problem”.

Deficits don’t matter inasmuch as they will not force the government into insolvency, but they do matter as long as they don’t produce inflation, or inflation expectations, that raise the funding cost of debt:

In fact, MMT-ers NEVER have said any such thing. Our claim is that a sovereign government cannot be forced into involuntary default. We have never claimed that sovereign currencies are free from inflation. We have never claimed that currencies on a floating exchange rate regime are free from exchange rate fluctuations. Indeed, we have always said that if government tries to increase its spending beyond full employment, this can be inflationary; we have also discussed ways in which government can cause inflation even before full employment. We have always advocated floating exchange rates — in which exchange rates will, well, “float”. While we have rejected any simple relation between budget deficits and exchange rate depreciation, we have admitted that currency depreciation is a possible outcome of using government policy to stimulate the economy.

Stephanie Kelton is a leading advocate of MMT, and she was an advisor to Bernie Sanders in his failed presidential campaign. Kelton has stated that deficits have been a political football for Republicans as long as they don’t interfere with GOP priorities. No one asked “how will you pay for it” during the last two rounds of tax cuts when it was clear that tax cuts did not pay for themselves in the Reagan era, nor the Bush II era. No one asked “how will you pay for it” about the post 9/11 Iraqi invasion, or Trump’s “space force”. It is only a priority when Republican priorities such as cutting Social Security and Medicare arise, see Kelton’s Bloomberg essay “Republicans Want To Make Social Security the Next Caravan”.

Combine that with Donald “the debt guy” Trump, who the Washington Post reported told his former economic advisor Gary Cohn to just “print more money”:

Trump reported told Cohn to print more money, according to three White House officials familiar with his comments.

“He’d just say, run the presses, run the presses,” one former senior administration official said, describing the president’s Oval Office orders. “Sometimes it seemed like he was joking, and sometimes it didn’t.”

Are the MMTers right? Here is the actual interest expense of federal debt, normalized by GDP. Even if rates were to rise, interest costs are in the lower range of the historical experience. The MMT debate therefore hinges on at what price the bond market will finance any debt surge.
 

 

For some perspective on the price of a potential debt surge, the chart below approximates incremental deficit financing costs, assuming that each year’s deficit is half financed with 2-year debt and half with 10-year debt. The blue line depicts the absolute dollar costs, and the red line depicts costs as normalized by GDP. From this perspective, incremental debt costs are well under control, and they have actually improved since the deficits from the Reagan years.
 

 

Whatever you might think of MMT, Trump and the MMT crowd are likely to find some common ground. The open question is whether both sides can come together to craft a deal for further fiscal stimulus, such as an infrastructure bill.

Can another massive fiscal stimulus save the American economy? Possibly. Much depends on the degree of cooperation between the White House and the Democratic controlled House, and any ultimate agreement on a bill.

At a minimum, investors should expect more discussion of MMT in 2019.

In conclusion, stock market fundamentals are under the threat of rising recession risk, and I have penciled in a 30% drawdown for US stock prices. There are two possible factors that could either mitigate or halt the decline, namely the reversal of the trade war, or further fiscal stimulus supported by the theories of MMT. The jury is out as to whether these positive catalysts can actually happen, so I remain “data dependent”.
 

The week ahead

The technical conditions of the stock market continues to show the pattern of a bear market. The chart below shows the 20 dma of the new low/new high ratio. Past spikes have generally been seen in bear phases, and not corrections within a bull move.
 

 

Deteriorating long-term breadth is another sign that the market is in a major bear phase. In the past, the bulls have taken begun to take back control of the tape when % bullish (black vertical line) have violated its downtrend, followed by % of stocks above the 200 dma (blue line).
 

 

Bear markets are also marked by higher levels of volatility. Sharp drops are often followed by sharp rallies. We have recently seen a sharp drop, and sentiment certainly looks washed-out. The most recent AAII sentiment survey showed a dramatic rise in bearishness, indicating possible capitulation. Past readings at these levels have tended to be contrarian bearish.
 

 

Other short-term sentiment indicators are also supportive of a bounce (see Good news and bad news from the sentiment front). The NDR Daily Sentiment Composite is in the “extreme pessimism” zone, where the historical annualized gain stands at 32%.
 

 

The latest update from Open Insider shows that this group of “smart investors” are buying the latest dip in the market.
 

 

Next week is option expiry week, and Rob Hanna found that December OpEx has historically shown the best risk/reward ratio for the bulls.
 

 

In a separate post, Hanna observed that December’s positive seasonality isn’t just restricted to OpEx week, but it has persisted for up to three weeks.
 

 

From a technical perspective, the roof hasn’t caved in on the bulls despite all of my talk of a bear market. The market tanked Friday, but the decline was insufficient to set of a Dow Theory sell signal, though the recent Dow Theory buy signal came to nought.
 

 

Longer term breadth indicators from Index Indicators show a positive divergence that has been observed in past market bottoms.
 

 

Short-term breadth is oversold, with the caveat that oversold markets can become more oversold.
 

 

There has been some analysis floating around the internet that highly negative Fridays have tended to see bearish follow-through on Mondays. My own investigation of data of SPX returns shows that there were 60 instances where the SPX fell by -2.0% or more on a Friday. The subsequent median return was 0.07%, with a batting average of 55.0%, compared to 0.05% median return and 53.4% batting average on all days. In other words, there may be a minor rebound effect, but Monday returns are virtually indistinguishable when the market tanked the previous Friday.

In summary, major bear legs simply do not start with technical and sentiment so stretched on the downside. Even if you are bearish, which I am, traders would be well advised to wait for a rally before going short.

That said, there are still some near-term risks. The latest update from FactSet shows that forward EPS estimates fell last week. As estimates have moved coincidentally with stock prices, further erosion in EPS estimates could prove to be a headwind for the market.
 

 

In addition, next week`s FOMC meeting could be a source of volatility.

My inner investor has already de-risked his portfolio to his minimum equity allocation. My inner trader remains positioned for a rally into year-end.

Disclosure: Long SPXL
 

Good news and bad news from the sentiment front

Posted by Cam Hui -

Mid-week market update: This market is becoming increasingly jittery. Indeed, the chart below shows that the stock market moves more per dollar traded than usual, indicating a lack of liquidity.
 

 

This indicates that volatility is likely going to increase. Such an environment can be both profitable and trying for traders, as I have both good news and bad news from the sentiment front.
 

Long-term complacency = More downside risk

Let us start with the bad news. My former Merrill Lynch colleague Fred Meissner of The FRED Report is finding signs of long-term complacency in the Investors Intelligence data, and readings are similar to levels observed before the Crash of 1987.

The Investor’s Intelligence poll has three categories: Bulls, Bears, and those expecting a correction. We only chart the Bears, and this is why. Managers that are bulls are invested, and managers that are expecting a healthy correction generally remain invested. Managers that are bears are the only ones that really sell, and we assume that they have already sold – in other words, a low %Bears number is ammo for a decline. What normally happens, as markets decline, is that the % Bears number advances. We can see this in the 2010 to 2012 correction, the 2015 to 2016 correction, also in the 1990’s and in the 1970’s. Our concern is that this is not happening during this current corrective phase. One of the most significant times we saw this is during the 1986 to 1988 period, specifically during the 1987 crash period.

Low II %Bears readings indicate complacency:

The takeaway is that low %Bears very often leads to violent declines, especially if the %Bears does not increase as the market is correcting. In addition, it is not low %bears in a vacuum. If the market is rallying and the %bears are low, it is a condition to be monitored but not necessarily a reason to sell. It is how the %Bears react in periods of consolidation and/or correction that is most important.

However, he is not calling for a 1987 style crash (chart annotations are mine).

This does NOT mean we are entering another 1987-like period, but it does mean advisors should be on their guard and know what defensive steps they want to take in a more protracted decline.

 

 

I agree. II sentiment is not consistent with levels seen at long-term market bottoms. In light of the technical breakdowns that I have pointed out before, this suggests further downside risk for stock prices.
 

Short-term washout

On the other hand, Mark Hulbert recently wrote that his sentiment indicators are at washed-out extremes. Both his market timers (blue line) and NASDAQ timers (red line) indices are at levels not seen since Brexit. This sentiment extreme indicating a crowded short is setting the potential for a market rally. However, Hulbert has noted in the past that his sentiment models are most effective at predicting returns only on a one-month horizon.
 

 

Smart money vs. retail money

For a different perspective on sentiment, I am indebted to one of my readers for the (sort of) good news. He has dissected the put/call option activity between the smart money and the retail money. The “smart” money is defined as the index put/call ratio, because the pros tend to dominate activity in index options. By contrast, retail investors dominate individual stock option activity, and their sentiment is better measured by the equity-only put/call ratio.

As the chart below shows, we would prefer to be buying when both the “smart” money and retail money indicators agree with each other, which is defined as a low index put/call ratio (red line, bottom panel) and a high equity-only put/call ratio (blue line, bottom panel). The two indicators are combined in the top panel as the equity put/call – index put/call (blue line, top panel).
 

 

What are the indicators saying now? Retail investors are highly fearful, as measured by the spike in the equity-only put/call ratio. By contrast, the pros are skeptical that the bull case, as their hedging is manifested in an elevated index put/call ratio. This combination is not immediately bearish, as the spike in the equity-only put/call ratio can be supportive of a short-term rally, but the high index put/call ratio suggests any market strength is probably not sustainable.

Here is the big picture. Expect a rally, but don’t expect it too last very long.

My inner investor remains cautious on the stock market. My inner trader covered his short positions last Friday and flipped to the long side in anticipation of profiting from an oversold rally.

Disclosure: Long SPXL

 

Pax Americana, or America First?

Posted by Cam Hui -

December is the season for investment advisors and portfolio managers to meet with their clients. Here are some thought on your an allocation framework as you prepare for those meetings. As a cautionary message, let’s begin with a “buy and forget” portfolio featured in Fortune in 2000 and how they performed by 2012.
 

 

Haha. Experienced portfolio managers and advisors don’t make those kinds of mistakes. We all know that diversification is the only free lunch in investing.

For the simple answer on personal investing, I refer readers to a Business Insider article by Chelsea Brennan, “I spent 7 years working in finance and managed a $1.3 billion portfolio — here are the 5 best pieces of investing advice I can give you”:

  1. Understand your goals
  2. Index fund investing is the easiest way to win
  3. Be in it for the long term
  4. Don’t assume you have it all figured out
  5. Be prepared for anything

Unfortunately, I see American investors making the diversification mistake, as well as mistakes 4 and 5 again and again. Much of what passes for financial planning in the US is based on the mistaken assumption of a backtest that has severe survivorship problems. This will becoming increasingly evident as American policy changes from the era of Pax Americana to America First.
 

The long term record

Tiho Brkan pointed out that when US investors make their investment allocation decisions, they often consider this familiar chart of the record of equity returns. Looks pretty good, right?
 

 

If you went into a client meeting in most industrialized countries with that chart, you would have been laughed out of the room. That’s because if you step back more years, and the return pattern is less familiar and feels distinctly uncomfortable.
 

 

America ascendant

Here is the survivorship problem. A bet on US equities in the last 100 years has been a bet on Pax Americana. Morgan Housel explains what happened in a rather long article:

This is a short story about what happened to the U.S. economy since the end of World War II.

That’s a lot to unpack in 5,000 words, but the short story of what happened over the last 73 years is simple: Things were very uncertain, then they were very good, then pretty bad, then really good, then really bad, and now here we are. And there is, I think, a narrative that links all those events together. Not a detailed account. But a story of how the details fit together.

The entire article is well reading in its entirety, but here is a brief summary:

  1. August 1945, World War II ends: The fear at the time was another Depression. What was America going to do with all of those men coming home from the war? How were they going to find jobs?
  2. Low interest rates and the birth of the American consumer.
  3. Pent-up demand for stuff led to a credit boom and a hidden 1930s productivity boom led to an economic boom.
  4. Gains are shared more equally than before: The defining characteristic of economics in the 1950s is that the country got rich by making the poor less poor.
  5. Debt rose tremendously. But so did incomes, so the impact wasn’t a big deal.
  6. Things start cracking in the early 1970s: America dominated the world economy in the two decades after the war. Many of the largest countries had their manufacturing capacity bombed into rubble. But as the 1970s emerged, that changed. Japan was booming. China’s economy was opening up. The Middle East was flexing its oil muscles.
  7. The boom resumes, but it’s different than before: All that matters is that sharp inequality became a force over the last 35 years, and it happened during a period where, culturally, Americans held onto two ideas rooted in the post-WW2 economy: That you should live a lifestyle similar to most other Americans, and that taking on debt to finance that lifestyle is acceptable.
  8. The Big Stretch. the internet after that: The lifestyles of a small portion of legitimately rich Americans inflated the aspirations of the majority of Americans, whose incomes weren’t rising. A culture of equality and Togetherness that came out of the 1950s-1970s innocently morphs into a Keeping Up With The Joneses effect.
  9. Once a paradigm is in place it is very hard to turn it around: The post GFC hangover sets in.
  10. The Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street, Brexit, and the rise of Donald Trump each represents a group shouting, “Stop the ride, I want off.”

While what Housel described was American economic history in the post World War II period, the US boom really began when the Great Powers battled each other to exhaustion in World War I, while the US economy remain largely unscathed.

Stocks for the long run? Just ask the Germans how their asset classes fared since the start of the 20th Century.
 

 

For some perspective, an American investor would have made over 1200 times their money in real terms if they had invested in equities between 1900 and 2013.
 

 

The French fared as well as the Germans in total return, but with less drawdown. Still, returns paled when compared to US assets.
 

 

China, which is a major global engine of growth today, suffered considerable dislocation after Mao’s victory and didn’t turn around until recently.
 

 

Bottom line: US equities should behave as they have in the last 100 years as long as there is no permanent loss of capital (see China, or undiversified bets such as the Fortune buy-and-forget portfolio), or a loss of the US competitive advantage.
 

The effects of America First

Here is where Trump’s America First policies pose a threat to long-term equity returns. Before we begin, I would like to preface these remarks by pointing out that Morgan Housel’s history of the post-War America shows that the problems of populism did not just originate with Donald Trump. Trump’s ascendancy is just one manifestation of the problems that plague American society.

American foreign policy has pivoted from the US as the leaders of the free world, which I call the Pax Americana model, to a win-lose world view. Why should Americans maintain troops to protect Europe, South Korea, or other countries around the world? Why does Article 5 of the NATO treaty matter?  In effect, Trump is trading off the soft power of America to focus on hard power, based on the principles of America First.

Even as Trump withdraws from global leadership, A recent Pew Research Center poll shows that the residents of most countries prefer the old world order of American leadership over one dominated by China.
 

 

Does soft power matter? As an example, the accounts from Brookings show that China is trying to develop its soft power by attracting foreign students to its universities [emphasis added]:

In a classroom adorned with Mandarin characters. They are not studying in Nairobi but at China’s prestigious Peking University. The Kenyan students explain how China has given them full scholarships to receive educational opportunities they are deprived of at home and how they will gain skills they can take back to enrich their own countries.

China is keen to promote itself as a benefactor of international students. On the other side of the Pacific, the United States—the country that has actively inspired the world’s smartest and most curious students to come study on its shores for generations—seems to be moving in the opposite direction. Through a series of policies and actions, the Trump administration is driving foreign students away from the United States. Chinese students themselves only narrowly avoided being victims of a total ban pushed by Trump staffer Stephen Miller. China views this accelerating trend as an opportunity to fill the gap. In many parts of Africa and Asia, this change is already underway. And as foreign students pick Chinese campuses over U.S. ones, a critical element of America’s soft power is in danger of being eroded.

The United States is still the world’s hub when it comes to higher education. In 2016, more than 1 million international students enrolled at U.S. colleges and universities, while fewer than half a million studied in Chinese higher education institutions.

But China’s outreach to students in African and Asian countries, especially in developing regions where it has growing economic ties, so far has been highly successful. In 2016, over 60 African and Asian countries sent more students to China than to the United States. Laos, for example, sent 9,907 students to China and only 91 to the United States. The disparity holds true for countries farther afield: Algeria, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and Zambia sent more than five times the number of students to China than to the United States. Since 2014, the total enrollment of African students in China has surpassed that of the United States. In 2016, China hosted more than 60,000 African students, which represented a 44-fold increase over the year 2000.

At the same time as China has endeavored to expand its international higher education system, the U.S. government has scaled back its financial commitments. The Fulbright Program, a hallmark of U.S. cultural diplomacy since 1946, has faced calls for funding cuts since the Obama administration. Generations of participants—who are sponsored by the U.S. government—have gone on to important positions in academia, politics, think tanks, journalism, arts, and business around the world. Despite this impressive legacy, the Trump administration recommended a 71 percent reduction in funding for the program in its 2019 budget proposal.

The WSJ reported that foreign student enrollment is falling in the US:

“Students are not feeling welcome in some states, so they are looking beyond those states and heading to places where they will feel welcome,” she said.

The slowdown comes as U.S. schools struggle with demographic and revenue challenges due to the falling number of Americans graduating from high school. As a result, U.S. colleges and universities have become increasingly dependent on revenue generated from international students. Public schools often charge international students more than what domestic students pay.

The U.S. is also losing students to English-speaking countries such as Canada, Australia and the U.K, which have all seen growth in the past year.

“We’re hearing that they have choices; we’re hearing that there’s competition from other countries,” said Allan E. Goodman, president of the Institute of International Education.

 

As the US closes its borders to immigrants, the dynamism of the economy becomes visibly hobbled by the barriers erected to international students, who study at top US schools and who stay to startup new businesses. Bill Kerr, D’Arbeloff Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School, documented how the US has been an enormous beneficiary of inventor talent flow over the years.
 

 

Kerr wrote: “These inflows have reshaped US innovation in advanced technology sectors. The contribution of immigrants to sectors like computer science and biotech have increased dramatically over the past 40 years.”
 

 

Where will the immigrants come from to found next Intel, Apple (Steve Jobs’ father was a Syrian from Aleppo), or Google?  Can Pax Americana survive America First, which looks like a policy of short-term gain for long-term pain?

This is a point to ponder as investors review their long-term investment plans.

 

Forget the Powell Put, what about a Trump Put?

Posted by Cam Hui -

I have been engaged in a running debate about the possibility of a Trump Put in the market. My friend believes that Trump is likely to pull back from a full-scale trade war with China, as it would tank the stock market and increase the likelihood of a recession. The Republicans lost the House in 2018 with the unemployment rate at 3.7%. A recession in 2019 or 2020 will not only lose them the White House, but probably both houses of Congress. Trump wants to avoid that scenario at all costs.

The WSJ reported that Trump has been glued to the stock market and therefore highly sensitive to price gyrations:

As the stock market churned this week, President Trump anxiously called advisers both inside and outside the White House looking to ensure that his talks with China were not driving the selloff.

Fresh off what he described as a historic weekend meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping, Mr. Trump has questioned why the markets weren’t reacting more positively to the news of the potential breakthrough with Beijing. In consulting with advisers, he remained convinced that the volatility wasn’t his own doing, but rather, the product of the Federal Reserve’s plan to raise the benchmark interest rate.

As the stock market churned this week, President Trump anxiously called advisers both inside and outside the White House looking to ensure that his talks with China were not driving the selloff…

Fresh off what he described as a historic weekend meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping, Mr. Trump has questioned why the markets weren’t reacting more positively to the news of the potential breakthrough with Beijing. In consulting with advisers, he remained convinced that the volatility wasn’t his own doing, but rather, the product of the Federal Reserve’s plan to raise the benchmark interest rate.

In short, the President’s daily mood seems to be sensitive to stock prices:

Wall Street analysts took note of the administration’s comments this week around the trade talks. Analysts at Morgan Stanley declared them indicative of the administration’s “markets-sensitive” approach to policy-making.

Nomura Securities said that it was yet “another indication that President Trump is sensitive to the market and economic disruptions that his trade policies can generate. That sensitivity may suggest that there are limits on how he will push those policies.”

Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, speaking at The Wall Street Journal CEO Council in Washington on Tuesday, said that “the (stock) market is now in a wait and see” moment with regard to China: “Is there going to be a real deal at the end of 90 days or not?”

Is there a Trump Put in stock prices? If the market were to really tank, could a Trump change of heart on China turn the market around?
 

How NSS 2017 institutionalized America First

There is a tension between Trump’s focus on stock prices, and his core belief that America is being cheated by its trade partners, and by China in particular. It is unclear how this dynamic will play out.

I believe that that the die was cast in late 2017 when the National Security Strategy 2017 (NSS 2017) designated China as a strategic competitor (see Sleepwalking towards a possible trade war), and the Washington defense establishment widened the scope of the conflict. It is no longer just a trade dispute, but a struggle for strategic dominance.

Here is an evenhanded analysis of NSS 2017 by Peter Feaver in Foreign Policy from December 2017, which was described it as “America First all grown up”. He had five main takeaways:

  1. Give the administration credit for some unusual achievements related to the NSS. This is the first Administration to publish the NSS in its inaugural year. Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama all tried and failed to make that deadline.
  2. Give the administration credit for an NSS that is, to a surprising degree, well within the bipartisan mainstream of American foreign policy.
  3. Give the drafters credit for trying gamely to reform Trump’s problematic catch phrase label – “America first” – by reinterpreting it to mean something more benign. 
  4. That said, this is a bleaker, less optimistic NSS than the last several – in that respect, something of a throwback to Bush’ 2002 NSS, which was written in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The implicit theme of this NSS is competition – the word or its cognates appears nearly 75 times in the document. The NSS repeatedly reminds the reader how the United States faces competition and even exploitation from adversaries and partners alike. The NSS repeatedly reminds the reader how the United States faces competition and even exploitation from adversaries and partners alike.
  5. The devil will be in the details of execution, which will require bridging gaps between the rhetoric of Trump’s NSS and the reality of the policies pursued thus far.

Here is a key quote of how NSS 2017 institutionalized “America First”:

The NSS advanced a concept that has not had wide currency until now: the “national security innovation base (NSIB),” referring to the “American network of knowledge, capabilities, and people—including academia, National Laboratories, and the private sector—that turns ideas into innovations, transforms discoveries into successful commercial products and companies, and protects and enhance the American way of life.” The NSS notes, rightly, that the efforts by China (and others) to steal U.S. intellectual property should be viewed not merely as an economic problem, but also fundamentally as a national security threat. I think the NSS misses a step here in failing to recognize that this is not merely an “American” network, but rather a globalized network with America as a critical node. Thus, steps that have the unintended effect of hobbling the flow of ideas and human capital into the United States might hurt the NSIB. But Trump deserves credit for raising the salience of this concern.

 

Trump’s Deep State Frankenstein?

I don’t mean to sound like some conspiracy theorist, but here is how the wheels of government works. Remember the Bloomberg story back in October that some Chinese spy chip had been discovered on the motherboard of servers used by Apple and Amazon? Both companies subsequently denied the story. The denial appeared to have been made at a technical level, rather than corporate lawyers (see this Medium article discussing the technical issues). Reuters reported that the denial was supported by the UK’s cyber security agency supporting the Apple position, and the denial was also supported by the US Department of Homeland Security.

Here is the conspiracy theory part. This incident is consistent with an effort by US intelligence agencies to discredit the Chinese and retard their sales overseas. The SCMP reported that entire incident is forcing American vendors to re-think their relationship with Chinese suppliers. Several allies have banned Chinese telecom 5G equipment from their networks. That`s how the Deep State works.

The Huawei affair is different. The arrest and subsequent extradition request was likely the case of the left hand of the US government did not know what the right hand was doing during the summit at Buenos Aires. Trump didn’t know, but NSC advisor John Bolton did. During her bail hearing, Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou`s lawyer so much as admitted that Huawei busted sanctions by tricking American banks to send funds to Iran.

So this becomes a case of the dog that caught the car, what to do next?

The Huawei arrest is undoubtedly putting a chill on trade negotiations. Supposing that Trump wanted to use Meng Wanzhou as a bargaining chip to get some concessions from China and declare victory, such a course of action will not be without incurring significant political cost. Bloomberg reported that there is bipartisan support for holding Huawei to account, and any ZTE-like pardon will be met with a political fight.

After Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou was arrested in Vancouver Dec. 1 at the behest of U.S. authorities for allegedly violating American sanctions on selling technology to Iran, Democrats and Republicans have quickly called on Trump to hold the Chinese company accountable.

The dilemma Trump could face on Huawei is partly of his own making. In May, his Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross went after ZTE Corp., a rival Chinese telecoms equipment maker, with charges of violating sanctions agreements by selling U.S. technology to North Korea and Iran. When the administration eased the punishment at the request of Chinese President Xi Jinping, a bipartisan group of lawmakers criticized Trump for going soft on China.

“If @Huawei has been helping violate US sanctions by transferring US technology to Iran they should be barred from operating in the US or from purchasing US technology,” Senator Marco Rubio of Florida said Thursday on Twitter.

Senator Mark Warner, a Virginia Democrat, added to the criticism on Thursday “It has been clear for some time that Huawei, like ZTE, poses a threat to our national security.”

This is how bureaucratic infighting works. Put the President in a difficult situation in order to shape events in accordance to your own agenda.

Huawei has long been a concern for the U.S. government and lawmakers who believe Chinese technology companies are avenues for surveillance by the country’s intelligence agencies.

Now Trump is in a tough spot to navigate domestic political pressure with successful trade negotiations, said Derek Scissors, China expert at the American Enterprise Institute.

Fining Huawei or requiring personnel changes accomplishes nothing. If he lets Huawei off the hook, it may look like the ZTE fiasco, where he canceled tough action because “too many jobs in China lost,” Scissors said. “But serious steps against Huawei will effectively end this round of trade talks because the company — not its officials — is so important to the Communist Party.”

In conclusion, it will take a lot more than just a few Trump tweets to stop Cold War 2.0 between the US and China. At the same time, Trump’s focus on stock market movements may prompt presidential tweets that will spark temporary market rallies. Unless Trump takes actual institutional steps to reverse course, such as sidelining hardliners like Navarro, Lightizer, Bolton, along with any other NSC staffers who authored NSS 2017, don’t expect Trump to put a floor on stock prices.
 

A Bear Market is now underway

Posted by Cam Hui -

Preface: Explaining our market timing models
We maintain several market timing models, each with differing time horizons. The “Ultimate Market Timing Model” is a long-term market timing model based on the research outlined in our post, Building the ultimate market timing model. This model tends to generate only a handful of signals each decade.

The Trend Model is an asset allocation model which applies trend following principles based on the inputs of global stock and commodity price. This model has a shorter time horizon and tends to turn over about 4-6 times a year. In essence, it seeks to answer the question, “Is the trend in the global economy expansion (bullish) or contraction (bearish)?”

 

My inner trader uses the trading component of the Trend Model to look for changes in the direction of the main Trend Model signal. A bullish Trend Model signal that gets less bullish is a trading “sell” signal. Conversely, a bearish Trend Model signal that gets less bearish is a trading “buy” signal. The history of actual out-of-sample (not backtested) signals of the trading model are shown by the arrows in the chart below. The turnover rate of the trading model is high, and it has varied between 150% to 200% per month.

Subscribers receive real-time alerts of model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts are updated weekly here. The hypothetical trading record of the trading model of the real-time alerts that began in March 2016 is shown below.

 

The latest signals of each model are as follows:

  • Ultimate market timing model: Sell equities
  • Trend Model signal: Bearish
  • Trading model: Bullish

Update schedule: I generally update model readings on my site on weekends and tweet mid-week observations at @humblestudent. Subscribers receive real-time alerts of trading model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts is shown here.

The Ultimate Timing Model flashes a sell signal

Over the years, I have struggled with the problem of integrating technical analysis into an investment process. Trend following systems that employ one or more moving averages work well longer term, but they have the disadvantages of being slow (by design), and they can produce false positives which whipsaw during trendless periods.

The chart below shows how a simple 200 dma as a buy and sell signal would have worked for the SPX in the last 20 years. The good news is it kept you out of major bear markets, but at the cost of numerous whipsaws, which are circled.

 

I am indebted to the blogger at Philosophical Economics who suggested a macro overlay to trend following systems (see Building the ultimate market timing model). Major bear markets generally occur under recessionary conditions. Why not ignore moving average signals until your macro model is forecasting a recession?

This “Ultimate Market Timing Model” is ultimately beneficial for long-term investors. If you could cut off the left tail of the return distribution and avoid the really ugly losses, you could run a slightly more aggressive asset mix and receive a higher expected return with lower risk. For example, if the standard risk-return analysis dictates a 60% stock and 40% bond asset mix, you could change it to a 70/30 mix with this model, and get downside risk similar to the 60/40 portfolio. To be sure, this system isn’t perfect, and anyone using such a model will have to incur “normal” equity risk, and it would not have kept you out of the market in the 1987 Crash.

Stock prices have been weak for several months. Today, any flavor of moving average system would produce at best a neutral signal, and at worst a sell signal. At the same time, I have been maintain a Recession Watch suite of long leading macro indicators designed by New Deal democrat to spot recessions a year in advance. My latest review (see 2019 preview: Winter is coming) shows that the macro models are flickering red, indicating a slowdown in 2019, but I am not ready to call a recession yet using conventional macro analysis.

However, good modelers also know the limitations of their models, and other factors that are not captured by the Recession Watch indicators are sufficiently negative for me to call for a recession to start in late 2019 or early 2020. The combination of weak stock prices and a recessionary call therefore changes my Ultimate Market Timing Model to a sell signal.

The current drawdown for the SPX from its peak is about 10%, which represents an acceptable level of equity risk for a long-term asset allocation model for patient money. Investment oriented accounts should move to a maximum defensive posture. Tactically, the market is very oversold and poised for a relief rally. Investors should take advantage of any strength to reduce equity risk. Traders may want to position themselves for the anticipated advance into year-end.

A Recession Watch review

The Recession Watch indicators are separated into three broad categories:

  • Household sector
  • Corporate sector
  • Financial and monetary conditions

So far, the household sector has been weak, and the weakness can be especially seen in the cyclically sensitive housing sector. Monetary conditions are decelerating as the yield curve continues to flatten and real M1 growth has negative for two consecutive weeks. However, readings are noisy and not persistent enough to call for an outright recession,

The good news is the corporate sector has been relatively healthy. In particular, corporate profits are holding up well, the latest ISM Manufacturing and IHS Markit Manufacturing PMI releases have been strong. Moreover, recessions have always coincided with tightening credit, and credit conditions remain loose.

In conclusion, the economy is weakening, but not weak enough to make a definitive recession call.

A separate recession model by Dwaine Van Vuuren of Recession Alert is also very near a full-blown recession signal. He compared his own model to the ECRI Weekly Leading Indicator (WLI) and found that WLI tends to be noisier, more responsive to changes to conditions, but at the price of more false positives:

The ECRI WLI can lead the WLEI on many occasions, as it is composed of some longer leading and/or more sensitive indicators than the WLEI.

When we constructed the WLEI our focus was less on longer leading characteristics and more on less “false positives”. As you can see from the chart the WLI has had 4 false positives so far this business cycle versus 1 for the WLEI. It’s a good pairing for high frequency leading data – you take the ECRI WLI as the 1st warning and the WLEI as second. If both are flagging recession, which looks increasingly likely in the next few weeks, you obviously need to take note and start consulting the more robust monthly models or the SuperIndex which is composed of many monthly models.

 

Notwithstanding the results of conventional economic analysis, here are the two reasons that made me make a recession call are:

  • Global weakness and fragility
  • The (almost) inevitability of a full-blown trade war

 

Global weakness

I recently had a discussion with a reader about my set of long leading indicators, and he pointed out the blind spot in my approach. The rest of the world has been slowing substantially, and the US has been the last bastion of growth. Focusing on just US-centric indicators will therefore result in a falsely rosy view.

Indeed, the NDR global recession probability estimate now stands at 82%, while most US recession models are in the 30% range, which is much lower.

 

Similarly, Chris Williamson at IHS Markit recently pointed out that the US has been the last man standing when it comes to economic growth.

Non-US PMIs peaked in late 2017 or early 2018.

 

Germany, which has been the locomotive of eurozone growth, may already be in recession. German GDP shrank by -0.2% in Q3. The annual EPS growth rate of the DAX Index is now negative, and the last time this happened was the Greek Crisis of 2011.

 

The key risk for the eurozone is they never fixed their banking excesses from the last crisis. Bank assets to GDP remain outsized compared to the rest of the world. Financial contagion risk from Europe is high should the world slow into recession.

 

China: Running out of bullets

The other source of major global systemic is China. We have all heard about the debt buildup in China, and how it is unsustainable, etc. This time, China may be finally hitting the debt wall.

The Chinese economy was already slowing before the onset of the trade war. Much of the moderation in growth was engineered by Beijing in order to better control burgeoning debt. That said, John Authers recently pointed out that efforts at further credit driven stimulus is not having the expected response because of the law of diminishing returns.

 

China’s policy options are becoming more and more limited. Then we have the problem of the trade war becoming Cold War 2.0. I wrote about this problem back in January (see Sleepwalking towards a possible trade war), when America’s National Security Strategy 2017 designated China as a strategic competitor. Conflict was not just about trade, but in the geopolitical and military dimensions as well. This represents a major policy shift. These are not just Trump tweets that could be forgotten in a few days, but a major change in outlook by the Washington establishment. In other words, Cold War 2.0.

Then there is the problem of the trade war. The Trump-Xi meeting in Argentina produced a somewhat inconclusive he said-she said handshake truce. The terms were never put down in writing, and what was reported by each side sounded more and more like a wish list than an actual agreement. The markets staged a one-day relief rally on the news that the US tariffs scheduled for January 1 was to be delayed.

The effects of the scheduled January 1 tariffs are highly consequential for both countries. The chart below shows the project effects on Chinese GDP growth if the existing tariff rate rose from 10% to 25%, and the effects if Trump were to impose tariffs on all remaining imports from China. The IMF also projected that US GDP growth would decelerate by 1% in the event of a full-blown trade war.

 

It was never clear to the Chinese what Trump wanted from the negotiations, as the demands kept changing. It is becoming clear that, in addition to taking steps to reduce the trade deficit, the US wants China to stop its program of forced IP transfer from western companies. To China, this is viewed as a way of arresting their development, which is a non-starter. The appointment of Robert Lightizer as trade negotiator was undoubtedly a disappointment to China, as Lightizer is known as a trade hawk. An article in the Asia Nikkei Review indicates that Trump and Lightizer are demanding concessions that Xi simply cannot deliver.

Immediately after the 90-day period expires, China holds the most important political event of the year. This is the annual session of the National People’s Congress, China’s parliament, which gathers the great and the good of Chinese politics in Beijing for two weeks.
Trump has given Xi until then to make significant concessions in the trade negotiations. But the Chinese public was not informed of this ultimatum until Wednesday, when the Commerce Ministry finally touched on the 90-day time frame in a statement.

For China, any negotiation involving the country’s number one, Xi, cannot go wrong, let alone collapse. It was thus a forgone conclusion that the Xi-Trump summit would reach an “important consensus,” regardless of the facts.

Xinhua News Agency added an odd spin to its reporting of the agreement. “As required by the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing is committed to deepening reform and furthering opening-up,” the report said. “In the process, some economic and trade issues that are of Washington’s concern will be solved,” Xinhua added.

The sentences sum up Xi’s final offer, which has been formed through intraparty discussions.

To put it simply, the sentences tell us that Xi, who doubles as party chief, can only make concessions within the framework of the policies adopted at the quinquennial party congress of October 2017.

What were they?

“The Communist Party of China will lead the country to basically realize socialist modernization by 2035,” Xi said at the 2017 congress. Although his words were mild, his reference was to a grandiose plan calling for China’s economy to overtake the U.S. by 2035, some 15 years or so earlier than previously planned.

To do so, it calls for “stronger and bigger” state-run companies. And China will move closer to achieving the target if it acquires overseas companies with advanced technologies in accordance with “Made in China 2025,” a carefully designed blueprint for upgrading China’s strategic industries.

I don’t want to just blame the American side for this mess. The combination of the timing of the 90-day deadline and the institutional constraints of the Party’s policies also boxes Xi in from making any substantial concessions without losing face and making himself politically vulnerable. In short, both countries are locked into a struggle that increasingly looks like Cold War 2.0.

The latest news that Canadian authorities arrested the Huawei CFO at the request of the Americans because Huawei allegedly sold US equipment to Iran is another sign that the Buenos Aires truce is unlikely to last. Huawei’s CFO is the daughter of the company’s founder, and Huawei is one of China’s champions in the telecom equipment industry. This provocative action sends a chilling signal to China that the Americans are resolute in retarding China’s growth potential. The potential of tit-for-tat escalation is high unless cooler heads prevail. Numerous American executives live in China and they could also be taken into custody on charges. For example, the executive of any US company that sells weapons to Taiwan is in contravention of Chinese law and could be taken into detention.

At the same time, Trump tweets like this “tariff man” tweet doesn’t exactly help to calm tensions.

 

In the meantime, Chinese corporate defaults continue to rise.

 

In conclusion, conventional macro models indicate that readings are deteriorating and very close to a recession call, but not just yet. However, weakness in the non-US economies, economic weakness in China, even without a trade war, and the high likelihood of a trade war that is a byproduct of a new Cold War 2.0 are combining to push the US economy into recession in either late 2019 or early 2020.

The week ahead

The recent volatile market action bears the signature of a bear market. Longer term, I have warned on multiple occasions about the negative RSI divergence and MACD sell signal on the monthly Wilshire 5000.

 

I have also pointed out before the relative breakdown of bank stocks have led to major market dislocations in the past.

 

My former Merrill Lynch colleague Walter Murphy pointed out that market breadth readings are consistent with levels seen in past major bear markets:

The late Marty Zweig is well known for his breadth thrust indicator. Less well known is his high-low index measuring the 60-day ma of the ratio of NYSE 52-wk highs to 52-week lows. The attached chart shows that his index is now on a par with previous cyclical lows since 1974.

 

 

That said, last week’s -4.6% drop in the SPX moved readings to an oversold level, indicating that the market is poised for a relief rally. Counter-trend rallies during bear markets can be short and sharp, so traders should keep that in mind as part of their risk management.

The SPX closed the week by testing its November lows while exhibiting positive RSI divergences. In addition, the VIX Index is within a hair of its upper Bollinger Band, which is indicative of an oversold condition.

 

Steve Deppe observed that the bearish engulf pattern for the SPX on the weekly chart. Historical analysis shows that such patterns tend to be bullish in the short-run, though volatility can be vicious.

 

Short and long term breadth indicators from Index Indicators are supportive of short-term strength. The market is oversold on short-term breadth.

 

On the other hand, longer term breadth indicators are exhibiting positive divergences seen in past bottoms.

 

My inner investor has already reduced risk. Subscribers received an email alert on Friday that my inner trader had covered his very profitable short position that he entered into early last week and gone long in anticipation of a reflex rally.

Disclosure: Long SPXL

Curb your (dovish) enthusiasm

Posted by Cam Hui -

Mid-week market update: In the wake of the Powell speech last week and the FOMC minutes, the market implied odds of rate hikes have plunged. While the base case calls for two rate hikes by June, the odds of a once and done policy after a December hike is rapidly increasing, while the probability of three more hikes by June has plunged.
 

 

Curb your dovish enthusiasm.
 

The Fed is abandoning forward guidance

I believe the market is reacting erroneously to the Fed’s new policy of abandoning forward guidance. They simply are not going to tell you where they think rates are going anymore.

The initial reaction to Powell’s speech was the Fed Funds rate was just below neutral. What he really said was:

Interest rates are still low by historical standards, and they remain just below the broad range of estimates of the level that would be neutral for the economy‑‑that is, neither speeding up nor slowing down growth.

There is a huge difference between “just below neutral” and “just below the neutral range”. What Powell said is factually correct. The Fed Funds rate target is currently just below the neutral range of 2.5% to 3.5%. However, raising rates to the middle of the range would still involve three rate hikes, which is higher than the market consensus.

As the Powell Fed struggles with its communication policy, there is bound to be some market confusion. I would pay the most attention to speeches by the triumvirate of Powell, the chair, Clarida, the vice chair, and Williams, the New York Fed president, who are all permanent voters on the FOMC. Then focus on the speeches of other Fed governors, who are also permanent FOMC voters, and lastly the regional presidents, who all have influence on policy, but they do not have the same resources as the Fed governors.

Please be reminded of Fed governor Lael Brainard’s September speech, where she stated that there are actually two neutral rates. There is a long-term neutral rate, which is specified by the “dot plot”, and there is a short-term neutral rate that is more responsive to current market and economic conditions:

Focusing first on the “shorter-run” neutral rate, this does not stay fixed, but rather fluctuates along with important changes in economic conditions. For instance, legislation that increases the budget deficit through tax cuts and spending increases can be expected to generate tailwinds to domestic demand and thus to push up the shorter-run neutral interest rate. Heightened risk appetite among investors similarly can be expected to push up the shorter-run neutral rate. Conversely, many of the forces that contributed to the financial crisis–such as fear and uncertainty on the part of businesses and households–can be expected to lower the neutral rate of interest, as can declines in foreign demand for U.S. exports.

In many circumstances, monetary policy can help keep the economy on its sustainable path at full employment by adjusting the policy rate to reflect movements in the shorter-run neutral rate. In this context, the appropriate reference for assessing the stance of monetary policy is the gap between the policy rate and the nominal shorter-run neutral rate.

In other words, the short-term neutral rate can rise above the long-term neutral rate in a hot economy. Another demonstration of Brainard’s hawkish views can be found in her speech this week on Treasury market structure, she sneaked in the phrase “with the economy now at or beyond full employment and inflation around target”.
 

What data dependence really means

Fed watcher Tim Duy thinks that the Fed is now data dependent and anything can happen. Policy will evolve in accordance with how the data comes relative to the Fed’s own estimates, which calls for a slowdown in 2019 to 1.8% growth:

The Fed is data dependent. Growth will almost certainly slow in 2019. If it looks like to slow sufficiently to halt the slide in the unemployment rate while inflation remains low, the Fed will slow the pace of rate hikes. If unemployment continues to slide while inflation remains low, then the gradual pace of rates will continue longer. If unemployment slides and inflation ticks up, the Fed will probably hike a little faster.

Luke Kawa of Bloomberg thinks that the market should be prepared for a hawkish surprise [emphasis added]:

Minutes of the Federal Reserve’s November meeting, released Thursday, showed that optionality is the name of the game. The word “neutral” was mentioned only once, showing the shift in focus away from this unobservable measure for the benchmark rate. Moreover, the Fed is discussing whether to change language in the policy statement about the need for “further gradual” rate hikes. Even if Fed officials’ dot-plot projections might suggest more hikes, when it comes to the statement it doesn’t make sense specifying that expectation if policy makers want to give the impression their position is flexible, based on the evolution of data and financial conditions. The spread between Eurodollar futures expiring next month and those due a year later — a proxy for Fed rate hikes priced for 2019 — fell below 25 basis points. Another bit of compression and the gap will have gone back to pre-taper-tantrum levels. But the minutes also hint that market participants may have gone too far in betting that the 2019 dots won’t be realized. Only “a couple” of Fed officials think that the policy rate is currently close to neutral — so it’s not a consensus view that the level at which these central bankers might be inclined to consider a pause is just around the corner. As such, traders are either very stubbornly fighting the Fed or will be vindicated in December, should the central bank shift its dot plot towards the market-implied view. Whatever the case, there’s scarcely any more room to price-in a less aggressive Fed without starting to discount rate cuts. Some strategists and investors argue that this means a further dovish tilt might be received negatively by risk assets, as it would imply a meaningful deterioration in the economic outlook.

In this era of reduced guidance and data dependence, investors will be better served by monitoring the evolution of growth, inflation, and rate projections in the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) released after each FOMC meeting.
 

A Jobs Report preview

The yield curve has been flattening dramatically in the last few days, which is freaking the market out. The upcoming Jobs Report will represent a more sobering perspective and key input to Fed policy. Initial jobless claims have been weakening (blue line, inverted scale) for several weeks, and they have been inversely correlated to stock prices (red line). This trend represents a warning for investors of possible weakness in employment next year.
 

 

History shows that there is a strong but noisy correlation between the changes in initial claims (red line, inverted scale) and Non-Farm Payroll (blue line). However, initial claims data tends to be noisy. Moreover, weakness in initial claims has either been coincident with NFP weakness, or led NFP peaks by as much as a year.
 

 

Will the NFP report disappoint? There are some reasons for optimism, growth in temporary employment and the quits to layoffs and discharges ratio has historically led NFP, and there has been no indication of weakness from those leading indicators.
 

 

Keep an open mind, but if NFP employment or Average Hourly Earnings were to come in above expectations, watch the market’s dovishness disappear like the morning mist.

For investors, the most important indicator will be the market reaction in the aftermath of the Jobs Report. Will the yield curve flatten further, or steepen? What will it tell us about the market’s growth expectations?

 

Say goodbye to the nostalgia of Trump’s 1950’s America

Posted by Cam Hui -

Last week, Donald Trump tweeted his dissatisfaction with General Motors’ decision to close four US plants.

 

I feel his pain. Indeed, wage growth in Old Economy industries have been stagnant for quite some time.

 

The WSJ wrote an editorial in response:

President Trump believes he can command markets like King Canute thought he could the tides. But General Motors has again exposed the inability of any politician to arrest the changes in technology and consumer tastes roiling the auto industry.

I agree. Trump’s 1950’s framework for analyzing the economy has become outdated. The world is moving on, and investors should move on too.

The death of P/B

Notwithstanding the pros and cons of the decisions of GM management, here is the message from the market. Jim O’Shaughnessy of O’Shaughness Asset Management highlighted the long-term return differential between the Price to Book factor (red line) and other cash flow factors. Simply put, P/B doesn’t work anymore as a stock selection technique anymore.

 

In the days of our parents and grandparents, investors analyzed companies based on the returns of corporate assets, and how hard management sweated those assets. Those days of companies of using the classic economic inputs of capital, labor, and rents (land) is becoming obsolete, as evidenced by the failure of the P/B factor in stock selection.

Here is how the Morgan Stanley auto analyst reacted to the GM decision:

The next morning, as we hosted joint investor meetings with HK-based clients with my European colleague Harald Hendrikse, we agreed that GM management has accomplished something truly unprecedented: elimination of significant excess capacity from a position of strength before the market downturn. We also agreed that the read-across to the global auto sector is highly significant.

He concluded:

GM is conducting a masterclass in how to manage a portfolio of increasingly obsolete businesses. Mary Barra’s leadership strength and strategic acumen are proving to be a valuable asset to shareholders. The GM team’s combination of awareness and action (vision and execution) is an example for OEMs globally that must guide these extremely large, complex, and frequently culturally entrenched organizations into new markets while dismantling parts of the business with potentially negative terminal values.

The world has changed, and building plants that employ production workers may not be the best way to compete for many companies in today’s economy.

Buffett’s pivot

As another example of how the world is changing, consider Warren Buffett, the legendary investor who spent a lifetime profiting from buying dull little businesses at reasonable prices. Adam Seessel explained in a recent Fortune article how Buffett has changed his stripes [emphasis added]:

Buffett began his career nearly 70 years ago by investing in drab, beaten-up companies trading for less than the liquidation value of their assets—that’s how he came to own Berkshire Hathaway, a rundown New England textile mill that became the platform for his investment empire. Buffett later shifted his focus to branded companies that could earn good returns and also to insurance companies, which were boring but generated lots of cash he could reinvest. Consumer products giants like Coca-Cola, insurers like Geico—reliable, knowable, and familiar—that’s what Buffett has favored for decades, and that’s what for decades his followers have too.

Now, in front of roughly 40,000 shareholders and fans, he was intimating that we should become familiar with a new reality: The world was changing, and the tech companies that value investors used to haughtily dismiss were here to stay—and were immensely valuable.

“The four largest companies today by market value do not need any net tangible assets,” he said. “They are not like AT&T, GM, or Exxon Mobil, requiring lots of capital to produce earnings. We have become an asset-light economy.” Buffett went on to say that Berkshire had erred by not buying Alphabet, parent of Google. He also discussed his position in Apple, which he began buying in early 2016. At roughly $50 billion, that Apple stake represents Buffett’s single largest holding—by a factor of two.

At the cocktail parties afterward, however, all the talk I heard was about insurance companies—traditional value plays, and the very kind of mature, capital-intensive businesses that Buffett had just said were receding in the rearview mirror. As a professional money manager and a Berkshire shareholder myself, it struck me: Had anyone heard their guru suggesting that they look forward rather than behind?

Buffett and his partner Charlie Munger became wildly successful by buying good companies with “moats”, or strong competitive positions, at reasonable prices. He avoided technology companies because he believed that their competitive moat were, at best, fleeting:

With the help of his partner Charlie Munger, Buffett studied and came to deeply understand this ecosystem—for that’s what it was, an ecosystem, even though there was no such term at the time. Over the next several decades, he and Munger engaged in a series of lucrative investments in branded companies and the television networks and advertising agencies that enabled them. While ­Graham’s cigar-butt investing remained a staple of his trade, Buffett understood that the big money lay elsewhere. As he wrote in 1967, “Although I consider myself to be primarily in the quantitative school, the really sensational ideas I have had over the years have been heavily weighted toward the qualitative side, where I have had a ‘high-probability insight.’ This is what causes the cash register to ­really sing.”

Thus was born what Chris Begg, CEO of Essex, Mass., money manager East Coast Asset Management, calls Value 2.0: finding a superior business and paying a reasonable price for it. The margin of safety lies not in the tangible assets but rather in the sustainability of the business itself. Key to this was the “high-probability insight”—that the company was so dominant, its future so stable, that the multiple one paid in terms of current earnings would not only hold but perhaps also expand. Revolutionary though the insight was at the time, to Buffett this was just math: The more assured the profits in the future, the higher the price you could pay today.

This explains why for decades Buffett avoided technology stocks. There was growth in tech, for sure, but there was little certainty. Things changed too quickly; every boom was accompanied by a bust. In the midst of such flux, who could find a high-probability insight? “I know as much about semiconductors or integrated circuits as I do of the mating habits of the chrzaszcz,” Buffett wrote in 1967, referring to an obscure Polish beetle. Thirty years later, writing to a friend who recommended that he look at Microsoft, Buffett said that while it appeared the company had a long runway of protected growth, “to calibrate whether my certainty is 80% or 55% … for a 20-year run would be folly.”

Here is how Buffett changed his mind on Apple, the platform company, which now comprises about one-quarter of Berkshire’s portfolio:

Now, however, Apple is Buffett’s largest investment. Indeed, it’s more than double the value of his No. 2 holding, old-economy stalwart Bank of America.

Why? Not because Buffett has changed. The world has.

And quite suddenly: Ten years ago, the top four companies in the world by market capitalization were Exxon Mobil, PetroChina, General Electric, and Gazprom—three energy companies and an industrial conglomerate. Now they are all “tech”—Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, and Alphabet—but not in the same way that semiconductors and integrated circuits are tech. These businesses, in fact, have much more in common with the durable, dominant consumer franchises of the postwar period. Their products and services are woven into the everyday fabric of the lives of billions of people. Thanks to daily usage and good, old-fashioned human habit, this interweaving will only deepen with the passage of time.

Explaining his Apple investment to CNBC, Buffett recalled making such a connection while taking his great-grandchildren and their friends to Dairy Queen; they were so immersed in their iPhones that it was difficult to find out what kind of ice cream they wanted.

“I didn’t go into Apple because it was a tech stock in the least,” Buffett said at this year’s annual meeting. “I went into Apple because … of the value of their ecosystem and how permanent that ecosystem could be.”

Buffett began to understand how platform companies like Apple, Google, and Amazon were breaching the competitive moat of the old economy companies that Berkshire once invested in:

As these platform companies create billions in value, they are simultaneously undermining the postwar ecosystem that Buffett has understood and profited from. Entire swaths of the economy are now at risk, and investors would do well not only to consider Value 3.0 prospectively but also to give some thought to what might be vulnerable in their Value 2.0 portfolios.

Some of these risks, such as those facing retail, are obvious (RIP, Sears). More important, what might be called the Media-­Consumer Products Industrial Complex is slowly but surely withering away. As recently as 20 years ago, big brands could use network television to reach millions of Americans who tuned in simultaneously to watch shows like Friends and Home Improvement. Then came specialized cable networks, which turned broadcasting into narrowcasting. Now Google and Facebook can target advertising to a single individual, which means that in a little more than a generation we have gone from broadcasting to narrowcasting to mono-casting.

As a result, the network effects of the TV ecosystem are largely defunct. This has dangerous implications not only for legacy media companies but also for all the brands that thrived in it. Millennials, now the largest demographic in the U.S., are tuning out both ad-based television and megabrands. Johnson & Johnson’s baby products, for example, including its iconic No More Tears shampoo, have lost more than 10 points of market share in the last five years—an astonishingly sharp shift in a once terrarium-like category. Meanwhile, Amazon and other Internet retailers have introduced price transparency and frictionless choice. Americans are also becoming more health conscious and more locally oriented, trends that favor niche brands. Even Narragansett beer is making a comeback. With volume growth, pricing power, and, above all, the hold these brands once had on us all in doubt, it’s appropriate to ask: What’s the fair price for a consumer “franchise”?

Investors like O’Shaughnessy understand how the world is changing. So does Warren Buffett. Does Trump understand the key drivers of a long-term sustainable competitive advantage, or will he continue to look in the rear-view mirror and focus on the old economic models?

For the last word, I conclude with the WSJ editorial from last Wednesday:

Mr. Trump and Democrats seem to believe that with the right mix of tariffs and managed trade they can return to a U.S. economy built on steel and autos. This is the logic behind the Administration stipulating in its new trade agreement with Mexico and Canada that 40% to 45% of a vehicle’s value must consist of parts made by workers earning at least $16 an hour.

But an economy doesn’t run on nostalgia. U.S. auto makers don’t fear the new wage mandate because engineering performed by higher-skilled U.S. employees accounts for ever-more of a vehicle’s value. GM could soon become as much a tech company as a manufacturer. Amid a strong economy, most laid-off GM employees should find work. GM may also decide to retool idled factories to produce trucks as Fiat Chrysler has with a plant in Michigan.

Old Economy, meet the New Economy.

2019 preview: Winter is coming

Posted by Cam Hui -

Preface: Explaining our market timing models
We maintain several market timing models, each with differing time horizons. The “Ultimate Market Timing Model” is a long-term market timing model based on the research outlined in our post, Building the ultimate market timing model. This model tends to generate only a handful of signals each decade.

The Trend Model is an asset allocation model which applies trend following principles based on the inputs of global stock and commodity price. This model has a shorter time horizon and tends to turn over about 4-6 times a year. In essence, it seeks to answer the question, “Is the trend in the global economy expansion (bullish) or contraction (bearish)?”

 

My inner trader uses the trading component of the Trend Model to look for changes in the direction of the main Trend Model signal. A bullish Trend Model signal that gets less bullish is a trading “sell” signal. Conversely, a bearish Trend Model signal that gets less bearish is a trading “buy” signal. The history of actual out-of-sample (not backtested) signals of the trading model are shown by the arrows in the chart below. The turnover rate of the trading model is high, and it has varied between 150% to 200% per month.

Subscribers receive real-time alerts of model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts are updated weekly here. The hypothetical trading record of the trading model of the real-time alerts that began in March 2016 is shown below.

 

The latest signals of each model are as follows:

  • Ultimate market timing model: Buy equities
  • Trend Model signal: Bearish
  • Trading model: Bullish

Update schedule: I generally update model readings on my site on weekends and tweet mid-week observations at @humblestudent. Subscribers receive real-time alerts of trading model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts is shown here.

Winter is coming

The market will undoubtedly react positively to the news from Buenos Aires at the market open on Monday. Both sides agreed to a 90-day ceasefire, where the US agreed to hold off on additional tariffs scheduled for January 1, and China agreed “to purchase a not yet agreed upon, but very substantial, amount of agricultural, energy, industrial, and other product from the United States to reduce the trade imbalance between our two countries”. The trade war will be back on if both sides don’t come to an agreement after 90 days.

Risk on!

Josh Brown had a terrific analogy for the stock market, though he could not claim to be the originator. He characterized the stock market as a untrained and hyperactive Jack Russell terrier leashed to its owner, the economy. Both move in the same general direction, but the dog`s movements are far more erratic and excitable. They don`t have the same temperament and tendencies, but over time, they move in the same direction.

Technical analysis can help with discerning the short-term movements of the dog, and fundamental and macroeconomic analysis gives us insights on the dog handler. Notwithstanding the results of the trade negotiations in Buenos Aires, our analysis of the handler (economy) provides ample evidence that winter is coming.

 

More ominous is the Morgan Stanley Leading Economic Indicator, which is pointing to a significant deceleration in earnings growth in 2019, even without a trade war.

 

The only question is whether it will be a mild or harsh winter.

Growth is decelerating

The signs of economic weakness are spreading, and don’t be surprised if the market take fright early next at the possibility of a recession. Calculated Risk reported that the Philly Fed Coincident Index is displaying signs of negative momentum.

 

In a separate post, Calculated Risk also reported that the Chemical Activity Barometer (CAB, red line) is also showing weakness. The CAB has shown itself to be a leading indicator of industrial production (blue line). While the deceleration in CAB is not signaling an actual contraction in industrial production, it does indicate decelerating growth ahead.

 

A more serious problem for equity investors is the evolution of EPS estimates. Analysis from John Butters of FactSet shows that earnings estimates revisions have flattened, indicating waning fundamental momentum.

 

FY 2019 estimates are now falling as analysts look ahead to next year.

 

Brace for disappointment in 2019

There are good reasons for the downward revisions to 2019 earnings estimates. First, the sugar high from the tax cut is wearing off.

 

In addition, the exchange rate will be another headwind for revenues.

 

Trade war or no trade war, economic activity is likely to slow in the first half of 2019. The prospect of rising tariffs pulled ahead some economic activity as companies stockpiled inputs. Moreover, management delayed capital investments because of trade policy uncertainty. Don’t forget wages. The Atlanta Fed’s wage growth tracker is showing upward wage pressure, and widespread signs of labor shortage will squeeze operating margins.

 

Put it all together, we have the picture of increasing pressure on earnings in 2019. The “E” in the forward P/E ratio is too high. Expect further downward revisions in the months ahead.

A mild or harsh winter?

Having established that a metaphorical winter is ahead, the only question left is whether it will be a mild or harsh winter. New Deal democrat, who has been monitoring the economy by splitting economic indicators into coincident, short and long leading indicators, stated that he was not ready to call a recession using conventional economic analysis. However, his conclusion comes with a caveat:

Between increased corporate profits and loose lending, as reflected in the Senior Loan Officer Survey several weeks ago, the producer side of the economy continued to do very well through September. Although several other long leading indicators, most importantly interest rates and housing turned negative by the end of September, this is enough to confirm that, left to its own devices, the economy should not roll over into recession in the first three quarters of next year.

The “left to its own devices” part in the above sentence, however, is an important qualifier right now, because it does not include the effect of Trump’s tariffs. This is an ongoing and generally haphazard public policy intervention into the market, and the early results, as measured by rail traffic in particular, have been negative. It is simply impossible for me to do anything more than guess how much that might change the conclusion. At the most, I would hazard that Trump will continue to add tariffs, and that it *could* take a weak economy, such as I already foresee for next summer, and tip it into contraction.

The caveat is the trade war. So far, the following chart shows that the effects have been mainly a trade skirmish than a full-blown war.

 

The IMF’s model projects that a full-blown trade war would reduce China`s GDP growth by 1.6% and US growth by about 1%. As well, most of Asia will caught in the crossfire.

 

In particular, a separate IMF study shows that the risk comes from the imposition of additional tariffs on approximately 260 billion in Chinese imports. While the Commerce Department’s initial  tariff list focused mainly on finished goods from China, the tariffs imposed on the remaining imports are on intermediate goods, which are inputs to US production. As the chart below shows, the effects of input tariffs on output and productivity (top panels) are far worse than the effects on output tariffs (bottom panels).

 

The 90-day truce achieved at the G20 achieves very little. The long-term issues remain intractable, China is not going to change its development strategy. Expect the Trump administration to re-impose its planned tariffs in some time in 2019. The two countries are still headed toward a Cold War 2.0.

The case for a mild winter

However, there are signs for optimism. Callum Thomas of Topdown Charts pointed out that State Street’s custodial data shows North American institutional investors have already de-risked their portfolios. How much more selling could they do?

 

I conducted a similar (unscientific) Twitter poll, and the results showed a similar defensive orientation.

 

In addition, insiders have been buying the most recent dip. The latest readings show that this group of “smart investors” continue to buy their own stock.

 

The forward P/E ratio has seen considerable multiple compression. If the market were to sidestep a recession, the degree of de-rating is consistent with past market hiccups, such as the episodes in 1995, 2011, and 2015. Now imagine that estimates go down 10-15% for the reasons I cited. If stock prices were to remain unchanged from today’s levels, the forward P/E ratio rises to 18.4 if estimates fall 15%, which indicates minor downside risk, but no major decline.

 

If the economy avoids a recession under the “mild winter” scenario, I expect stock prices to weaken in 1H 2019, and that should provide the buying opportunity for investors. If the US and China can keep the trade tensions controlled, and the world sidesteps a recession, then the mild winter scenario is very much in play.

On the other hand, if either the trade conflict deteriorates into a full-blown trade war, or if the macro data in my set of long leading indicators weaken enough to signal a recession, then all bets are off.

The week ahead

Looking to the week ahead, it’s difficult to conduct much in the way of technical analysis ahead of an event with binary outcomes such as the Trump-Xi meeting in Buenos Aires. In all likelihood, news of a truce will be the spark for the long awaited year-end rally. That said, how the market reacts to such an event can be more revealing that the bullish or bearish result from the announcement.

Here is what I am watching. I wrote about the effects of the USD has on the market’s risk appetite (see A Dow Theory sell signal?). Despite last week’s equity risk-on rally, the greenback advanced to within a hair of the 97.50 mark, which was my line in the sand for a 5% year-over-year change in the USD Index. Watch the market reaction in the upcoming week.

 

Stock prices also rose late last week in anticipation of a US-China deal. Short-term breadth is already overbought. I would be cautious about jumping into the anticipated melt-up on Monday.

 

As the market rallies on the good news, keep an eye on equity risk appetite, as measured by price momentum and the high beta/low volatility ratio.

 

The credit markets did not participate in the risk-on rally that occurred late last week, which is a cautionary signal of risk appetite. I will also be monitoring how the credit markets respond to the news from the weekend.

 

My inner investor has already de-risked his portfolio because his belief that winter is coming. My inner trader stepped aside and moved to cash last week to avoid the event risk from Buenos Aires.

A Dow Theory sell signal?

Posted by Cam Hui -

Mid-week market update: I suppose that this may sound counter-intuitive now that the market is undergoing a relief rally, but Ralph Acampora warned about a possible Dow Theory sell signal about two weeks ago should the DJIA decline to break its March lows.
 

 

What are the odds that the Dow will test its March lows, or break them to flash a sell signal?
 

 

Here are the bull and bear cases.
 

The bull case

I have highlighted extreme levels of equity bearishness in the past, in the form of AAII sentiment and the NAAIM Exposure Index, so I won’t repeat myself. Another data point of a crowded short appeared this week in the form of II sentiment. The bull-bear spread has fallen to levels not seen for two years.
 

 

Helene Meisler also very succinctly summarized the bull case last weekend in a Real Money article. The article is well worth reading in its entirety, but here are her key points. The chart patterns between the current episode of weakness looks very similar to the one experienced in 2015-16. It is therefore natural to think that the market will rally and come back down to re-test the previous lows.
 

 

She went on to demonstrate that the FAANG market leaders are performing better today than the 2016 episode. In addition, we are seeing a high low on the NYSE Advance-Decline Line compared to 2016.
 

 

Never say never, but the odds are stacked against a re-test of the old lows.
 

The bear case

Here is the bear case. It’s all up to the US Dollar. I have shown this chart before, but the stock market has historically come under stress whenever the annual change in the USD Index exceeds 5%. Any sign of strength up to about the 76.50 level would trigger that sell signal. The USD Index closed Wednesday at 96.83.
 

 

There is considerable upward pressure on the USD from economic growth differentials. According to Bloomberg’s consensus survey, the US ix expected to outgrow the eurozone and the UK by 1% next year, which is the widest divergence for 2019.
 

 

The market interpreted this week’s Clarida and Powell speeches as dovish and therefore USD bearish, but Fed watcher Tim Duy thinks that’s what happens when the Fed abandons forward guidance. They aren’t going to tell you where they think rates are going anymore:

The Fed is data dependent. Growth will almost certainly slow in 2019. If it looks like to slow sufficiently to halt the slide in the unemployment rate while inflation remains low, the Fed will slow the pace of rate hikes. If unemployment continues to slide while inflation remains low, then the gradual pace of rates will continue longer. If unemployment slides and inflation ticks up, the Fed will probably hike a little faster.

Discount the Fedspeak, watch if the evolution of the dot plot matches the “dovish” rhetoric.

This weekend will see the Trump-Xi meeting. Anything could happen. Further dollar strength at this point could create havoc for stock prices.

Subscribers received an email alert that I had sold my long positions into the rally ahead of the Trump-Xi meeting this weekend. It’s time to step aside ahead of this binary risk.

Stay tuned.
 

Is the Powell Put coming into play?

Posted by Cam Hui -

Is the Fed about to blink? There has been a growing chorus of analysts like Kevin Muir at The Macro Tourist who thinks so.

It is clear to me the Federal Reserve was intent on raising rates until something broke, and that last week enough things “broke” that they finally blinked.

What broke? Muir mentioned a number of possible triggers. First, there is the dire picture of global asset returns this year.

 

He also cited:

  • The collapse in oil prices;
  • Widening credit spreads; and
  • Political pressure from the White House (the WSJ reported that Trump expressed displeasure with Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin for his recommendation of Jerome Powell for the position of Fed Chair because the Fed’s tightening policy).

As a result, the trajectory of Fed Funds expectations has collapsed.

 

Muir concluded that it’s time for investors to prepare for a shift in monetary policy:

The Federal Reserve had previously been plugging their ears and telling the global financial community nah-nah-nah-we-can’t-hear-you-we’re-going-to-keep-raising-come-hell-or-high-water, but the economic and financial market weakness that was previously confined to the rest of the world, has finally come to America. The Federal Reserve is now very close to being on hold for the indefinite future. Sure, they will probably raise once more this December, but it’s most likely a one-and-done. Or at very least, much more a one-and-we-will-see.

What does this mean for the market? Tons. Whereas before investors were hiding in American stocks and shooting every other asset class, it’s probably time to do the opposite. Buy emerging markets. Sell U.S. dollars. Play for a steepener in the American yield curve. Buy commodities.

Now maybe it’s too early. Maybe there is more pain to come before the Fed truly panics. That could be. We will have to watch the Fed carefully for clues.

Does this mean the Powell Put is coming into play?

The alternative view

For the contrary view, I turn to seasoned Fed watch Tim Duy, who wrote a Bloomberg opinion piece that the Fed already has a slowdown embedded into its forecast, and it is unlikely to pause until economic growth underperforms its estimated long-term growth rate of 1.8% [emphasis added].

What’s going on here? The challenge for the Fed is managing an economy that is transitioning through an inflection point. The odds are very high that economic growth slows markedly next year. The lagged impact of the Fed’s seven rate hikes over the last two years (which is already evident in housing), fading fiscal stimulus and slower global growth all point in this direction. That is the Fed’s baseline forecast as well.

But will growth slow enough to ease what the Fed believes are underlying inflationary pressures? In general, central bankers believe the economy currently operates at or beyond full employment. To be sure, they are not sufficiently concerned to boost rates at a faster pace, believing instead they can use the opportunity to squeeze some extra slack from the labor market. Policy makers are, however, sufficiently concerned about the potential for overheating that they would prefer that unemployment didn’t drift much lower.

From the perspective of the Fed, that means growth needs to slow to something closer to 1.8 percent, which happens to be the Fed’s estimate of the longer-run growth rate. As of last month, the Fed forecast 2.5 percent growth for 2019, even with continued rate hikes. In other words, a slowdown to 2.5 percent leaves activity still too robust to ease the Fed’s concerns.

If the 1.8% GDP growth rate is the Fed’s line in the sand, how does that measure up to current forecasts? CNBC reported that Goldman does not expect growth to slow to that level until late 2019:

“Growth is likely to slow significantly next year, from a recent pace of 3.5 percent-plus to roughly our 1.75 percent estimate of potential by end-2019,” wrote Jan Hatzius, chief economist for the investment bank, in a note to clients on Sunday. “We expect tighter financial conditions and a fading fiscal stimulus to be the key drivers of the deceleration.”

The bank sees the economy expanding at 2.5 percent in the fourth quarter of this year, down from 3.5 percent last quarter. Real GDP growth will come in at 2.5 percent again in the first quarter of 2019, but then will slow to 2.2 percent, 1.8 percent and 1.6 percent in the next three quarters, respectively.

A separate CNBC report showed similar expectations from JP Morgan:

The economists expect that growth will hold above 2 percent in the first and second quarter, at 2.2 and 2 percent respectively, before falling to 1.7 percent in the third quarter and 1.5 percent in the fourth quarter. The economy last grew at less than 2 percent in the first quarter of 2017.

The Congressional Budget Office forecast was even more bullish. It expects real GDP growth of 2.4% in 2019 and 1.7% in 2020.

Duy went on to set out the conditions for a Fed pause:

What does the Fed need to see to change course? In the near term, it would require a fairly dramatic change in financial conditions. Falling stocks are not enough, especially considering the concern that equity markets were overvalued earlier this year. The stress on the financial system needs to broaden. I look back to the 2015-2016 period as a reference.

Even then, financial stress was matched with softer economic data, particularly in manufacturing. That’s what would shift the Fed’s perspective. Over the medium term, such as the next six months, the Fed would increasingly shift to a more dovish stance if evidence mounts that the economy is slowing in line with the Fed’s forecasts. The more slowing seen, the more the Fed will see the time for a pause is at hand. Of course, on the other side of the coin, if the slowing is not as deep as feared, then the Fed will track in a more hawkish direction.

That’s what it means to be “data dependent”.

Resolving the dilemma

One of the challenges for investors is the interpretation of Fed intentions. The Powell Fed has backed off the more explicit policy guidance program of the Yellen Fed, and it has now becoming more data dependent. In this environment, Fedspeak is likely to be more confusing than helpful, and investors should focus on the evolution of the dot plot rather than the speeches of Fed officials.

Even though the Phillips Curve has shown itself to be very flat this expansion cycle, the DNA of the Fed still believes in this model, and I am closely watching how employment and wage pressures are developing in the months ahead.

Consider this CNBC report that an astounding 67% of workers earning over $100,000 expect to change jobs in the year ahead:

According to a new report from Ladders, most workers making more than $100,000 are planning to quit their jobs within a year.

Ladders surveyed more than 50,000 workers earning over six-figures and found that 67 percent see themselves at the different company in just six months. About 40 percent would move out-of-state for just $10,000 more in pay.

“The gold rush of 2019 is on,” Ladders CEO Marc Cenedella tells CNBC Make It. “With an incredibly strong employment market, more professionals than ever are on the lookout for a better future.”

This kind of behavior by highly paid workers are screaming wage inflation, which is a development that the Fed cannot and will not ignore.

In addition, a BLS researcher also found that the quits to layoffs and discharges rate seem to lead growth in Non-Farm Payroll (red line). There is also apparent relationship between temporary jobs and NFP (blue line). Both of these indicators are pointing to a healthy jobs market.

 

Bottom line: The Fed is not going to blink until we start to see some definitive signs of deterioration in the jobs market and wage pressures.

 

A 2015 or 2011 style hiccup, or something worse?

Posted by Cam Hui -

Preface: Explaining our market timing models
We maintain several market timing models, each with differing time horizons. The “Ultimate Market Timing Model” is a long-term market timing model based on the research outlined in our post, Building the ultimate market timing model. This model tends to generate only a handful of signals each decade.

The Trend Model is an asset allocation model which applies trend following principles based on the inputs of global stock and commodity price. This model has a shorter time horizon and tends to turn over about 4-6 times a year. In essence, it seeks to answer the question, “Is the trend in the global economy expansion (bullish) or contraction (bearish)?”
 

 

My inner trader uses the trading component of the Trend Model to look for changes in the direction of the main Trend Model signal. A bullish Trend Model signal that gets less bullish is a trading “sell” signal. Conversely, a bearish Trend Model signal that gets less bearish is a trading “buy” signal. The history of actual out-of-sample (not backtested) signals of the trading model are shown by the arrows in the chart below. The turnover rate of the trading model is high, and it has varied between 150% to 200% per month.

Subscribers receive real-time alerts of model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts are updated weekly here. The hypothetical trading record of the trading model of the real-time alerts that began in March 2016 is shown below.
 

 

The latest signals of each model are as follows:

  • Ultimate market timing model: Buy equities
  • Trend Model signal: Bearish
  • Trading model: Bullish

Update schedule: I generally update model readings on my site on weekends and tweet mid-week observations at @humblestudent. Subscribers receive real-time alerts of trading model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts is shown here.
 

A smorgasbord recession?

Callum Thomas has a terrific chart depicting the scope of the global stock market weakness. At the end of October, roughly 13% of global indices were above their 200 day moving averages (dma). Such readings are normally seen at intermediate term lows, or as part of a broad based bear market.
 

 

If this is indeed an intermediate low like 2015, or even 2011, investors should buy with both hands. On the other hand, if this is the start of a recession-induced bear market, investors should continue to de-risk their portfolios.

At this point, the lights on my panel of long leading recessionary indicators are currently flickering, but not bright red. Paul Krugman recently postulated;

Right now there doesn’t seem to be one big thing setting us up for a crisis – not like the housing bubble before 2008, or the tech bubble of the late 1990s. But there are several smaller things: trouble in emerging markets, some softening of housing, commercial real estate, corporate debt. So we could have a “smorgasbord” recession like 1990-91, with several factors coming together. This could be a problem, because interest rates are still low and there’s not much room to cut.

Could we see a “smorgasbord recession” in the near future?
 

A wobbly US economy

Certainly, there are numerous signs that the American economy is looking a little wobbly. The cyclically sensitive housing sector appears to have topped out for this cycle.
 

 

The much watched 2s10s Treasury yield curve (red line) has not inverted, but the private sector yield curve, defined as the Baa bond yield minus the prime rate, has (blue line).
 

 

The 2s10s Treasury yield curve may not flash a recessionary signal this cycle because of the Fed’s quantitative easing (QE) and subsequent quantitative tightening (QT) programs. A study by Benn Steil at the Council on Foreign Relations found that the Fed’s efforts at QT have raised the 10-yield yield by 17 bp. If we were to adjust for the effects of QT, the current spread would narrow to just 6 bp, which is very close to an inversion.

The term premium fluctuates with supply and demand for particular bonds. The Fed’s accumulation of longer-term Treasuries during nearly five years of Quantitative Easing (QE) was a big source of demand, and therefore lowered the term premium on longer-term Treasuries. (Former <Fed Chair Ben Bernanke explains this well in his blog.) Fed economists estimated that yields on 10-year Treasuries at the end of 2017 would have been around 85 basis points higher than their then-level of 2.3 percent had the Fed not bought such bonds.

On the basis of these estimates of the effect of central-bank asset purchases on long-term rates, we calculate that asset run-offs so far—$24 billion per month on average—have boosted 10-year Treasury yields by about 17 basis points.

As well, retail sales may be topping out, though the evidence is not definitive. Retail sales to population made a top five months ago, but New Deal democrat indicated he does not want to call a top until he sees six months of weakness.
 

 

In a separate model, New Deal democrat also found that whenever the change in the Fed Funds rate exceeded the change in Non-Farm Payroll employment, a recession has been the result.
 

 

While the lines in the above chart are close, they have not crossed as a slowdown warning. However, the weekly reported initial jobless claims may be bottoming. If initial claims continue to rise, the weakness will eventually feed into the monthly NFP reports, and the blue line in the above chart, which represents the change in NFP, could fall enough to produce a recession warning.
 

 

Not all the news is dire. The recent credit deterioration in former bellwether GE has led to rising angst about widening yield spreads. Both Scott Minerd of Guggenheim Partners and hedge fund manager Paul Tudor Jones have voiced concerns about turbulence in the credit market. Indeed, credit crunches have always part of past recessions. For now, anxiety over yield spreads blowing out appear overblown, as they are only edging up and levels are nowhere near levels seen in the last two recessions.
 

 

Similarly, financial conditions (low is good on the graph) have deteriorated but readings remain benign by historical standards.
 

 

In summary, long leading indicators of US economic growth are decelerating. While readings are not indicative of a recession, they are getting close.
 

China weakness the next smorgasbord course?

There is also evidence that the current risk-off episode could be attributable to Chinese weakness as markets have been moving based on news from China (see Was the market swoon made in China?). In that case, could Chinese weakness be the next course in the smorgasbord recession?

A market analyst would have to be living as a hermit in the last few years not to have heard the warnings about the rising debt levels in China.
 

 

Even without the threat of a trade war, there are signs that China is weakening. Business confidence has plummeted to an all-time low.
 

 

There are also signs that China’s economy is hitting a debt wall. Fitch warned that China bond defaults are expected to rise despite policy easing:

Chinese corporate bond defaults are likely to continue to rise in 2019 due to high refinancing pressures, the government’s greater tolerance for defaults, and tight credit availability – despite the recent shift in the policy stance towards easing, says Fitch Ratings. Corporate defaults should remain concentrated in the private sector, which has benefitted less from policy easing than state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local-government financing vehicles.

Bloomberg reported that, in the space of just 11 months, China went from no USD corporate debt to more distressed debt than all other emerging markets. A separate Bloomberg article raised concerns that Chinese companies have been acting like banks by pledging their own assets as insurance for other private companies. Such daisy chain style financing creates possible cascading defaults should any company fail, and the others do not have sufficient capital cushions to sustain the losses arising from default:

Moves by Chinese companies to guarantee each others’ debt have left the world’s third-largest bond market prone to contagion risks — making it all the tougher for officials to follow through on initiatives to sustain credit flows.

Private companies have long had to be innovative in getting financing in Communist-run China, where state-owned enterprises have had preferential access to the banking system. Extending guarantees to each other helped businesses boost some lenders’ confidence enough to extend funding to them.

But now that China is going through a record run of debt defaults, the links pose the risk of a daisy chain of distress. Price moves are reflecting that. Tire-maker China Wanda Group has seen a 16 percent tumble in its notes due in 2021 since end-September, thanks to having provided guarantees to iron-wire maker Shandong SNTON Group Co., one of whose units failed to repay a bank loan two months ago.

Already, we are seeing sporadic defaults in the most vulnerable parts of the market, property development. Caixin reported that the Shenzhen Stock Exchange delisted Zhonghong Holdings Group, a property developer, because of poor share performance owing to a debt crisis.

The latest World Bank statistics show that China has external debts of $1.7 trillion, composed of $1 trillion in short-term debt and the remainder in long-term debt. That figure is quite manageable in light of China’s large foreign exchange reserves. But a recent SCMP article highlights analysis from Daiwa Capital Markets, which indicated that China’s total external debt position, which includes direct and indirect debt, is really $3 trillion.

Massive domestic debt has long been a headache for Beijing, but it is China’s growing external US dollar leverage that is being underestimated and it could possibly trigger a major financial crisis, according to Kevin Lai, chief economist for Asia excluding Japan at Japanese investment bank and securities brokerage Daiwa Capital Markets.

China’s US$3 trillion dollar debt makes it especially vulnerable because of tightening US dollar liquidity, a weakening yuan and the ongoing US-China trade war, said Lai.

Global dollar debt outside America has risen to US$12 trillion today from US$9 trillion in 2013, according to Lai. Of that total, 25 per cent, or US$3 trillion, has been borrowed by China Inc and its subsidiaries in Hong Kong, Singapore and the Caribbean. China’s US dollar cross-border claims have risen faster than any other emerging economy’s despite its partially closed capital account…

The amount of dollar debt raised by China in its offshore centres that has entered its banking system is worrying given the prospect of further depreciation pressure on the yuan’s exchange rate, said Lai.

Such a high level of external debt makes Chinese corporations vulnerable to the Fed’s tightening policy. It also puts the PBOC in a bind. China’s economy is already slowing, even without the trade war. If the PBOC were to ease, the yuan devalues and raises the debt burden of Chinese corporations that borrowed in USD. If it chooses to defend the CNYUSD exchange rate, it risks capital flight, which also puts downward pressure on the exchange rate.
 

Trade war or peace?

Then we have the trade war wildcard. Trump and Xi are expected to meet on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Buenos Aires on December 1, 2018. Expectations are low going into that meeting.

Mike Pence adopted a highly belligerent tone in an interview with the Washington Post while Pence was on his way to the APEC summit:

Pence told me in an interview that Trump is leaving the door open for a deal with Xi in Argentina, but only if Beijing is willing to make massive changes that the United States is demanding in its economic, military and political activities. The vice president said this is China’s best (if not last) chance to avoid a cold-war scenario with the United States.

“I think much of that will depend on Argentina,” Pence said. “The president’s attitude is, we want to make sure they know where we stand, what we are prepared to do, so they can come to Argentina with concrete proposals that address not just the trade deficit that we face … We’re convinced China knows where we stand.”

In addition to trade, Pence said China must offer concessions on several issues, including but not limited to its rampant intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, restricted access to Chinese markets, respect for international rules and norms, efforts to limit freedom of navigation in international waters and Chinese Communist Party interference in the politics of Western countries.

If Beijing doesn’t come up with significant and concrete concessions, the United States is prepared to escalate economic, diplomatic and political pressure on China, Pence said. He believes the U.S. economy is strong enough to weather such an escalation while the Chinese economy is less durable.

As a result of the disagreement between the US and China, APEC participants were unable to agree on the wording of a final communique. The dispute is not just over trade, but a conflict over economic and regional dominance that may be the start of a new Cold War. Business Insider reported that China is building another structure in the South China Sea as a sign that tensions are escalating.

On the other hand, there are some hopeful signs of a thaw in relations. China has prepared some concessions ahead of the Buenos Aires meeting (via CNN):

The Chinese government has presented an offer to the United States to try to push forward stalled trade talks before the leaders of the two economic superpowers meet at the end of this month, according to two people briefed on the discussions.

The opening bid falls short of many of the core demands the White House has repeatedly detailed as must-haves in trade talks with Beijing, including addressing technology transfers and intellectual property theft, according to one of the people briefed. Instead, the proposal has been described as a rehash of previous commitments Chinese leaders have publicly announced, like selectively lifting tariffs.

Another sign of a thaw appeared when China approved the visit of American aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan and her strike group of escort ships to Hong Kong. This decision stands in contrast to the refusal of the visit of the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp last September.

More importantly, the SCMP reported that trade hawk Peter Navarro has been excluded from the guest list at the Trump-Xi meeting. While the list of aides to accompany Trump is not fully known yet, the most likely candidates are Larry Kudlow, John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, Steve Mnuchin, Wilbur Ross, Robert Lighthizer, and US ambassador to China Terry Branstad. Kudlow and Mnuchin are known to be trade doves, while Lightizer is regarded as a hawk.

It is shaping up to be a battle of trade factions within the Trump administration as the American side heads into the meeting. US Trade Representative Lightizer fired a broadside at China last week. He released a report stating that China has not changed unfair and discriminatory practices that prompted President Donald Trump to impose tariffs on around $250 billion worth of Chinese goods.

The big picture issues appear to be intractable. In addition to a dispute over the trade deficit, the Americans wants China to change its economic development model. The probability of such an event is as likely as the US adopting a Canadian supply management system for milk and dairy products, which was an issue raised during the NAFTA negotiations.

(As a word of explanation, Canada made a political decision to control the supply of certain food products such as chicken and dairy products, because it believed that it did not want to subject important basics such as the food supply to the market volatility of supply and demand. Better to pay more for food to ensure a steady supply. As a result, farmers cannot just produce chicken, but they need to produce chicken under a government mandated quota. The US has similar supply management system, not in food, but in defense. Otherwise, the Pentagon would considering the purchase of the Eurofighter instead of fighter jets of domestic design.)

Which Trump will show up in Buenos Aires? Will it be the belligerent Trump, who is determined to reduce and eliminate the trade deficit with China, and to contain China’s threat to US dominance in key technologies? Or will it be the Trump who met KJU of North Korea, who decided that he liked the dictator well enough that he could do business with him? Were the rhetoric of the trade doves and hawks just playing a game of good cop-bad cop? While the Chinese and American negotiation teams are said to be in close contact in the period leading up to the summit, Axios reported that Trump was his usual enigmatic self when he discussed his preparations for his meeting with Xi Jinping:

I’m very prepared, I’ve been preparing for it all my life. It’s not like, oh gee, I’m going to sit down and study it. I know every detail. I know every stat, I know it better than anyone who’s ever known it and my gut has always been right.

Realistically, the best outcome would be an American decision to suspend the imposition of the next round of tariffs while both sides talk more. Will that happen?

Stay tuned.
 

The good news on China

The good news on China is, despite all of the dire reports, there are no signs that the dam has broken. Chinese official statistics are notorious for their creativity, but real-time market signals indicate no signs of a disorderly unwind of the debt bubble.

I have been monitoring the share price of key Chinese property developers, such as China Evergrande (3333.HK), which are highly levered. So far, the shares are holding support.
 

 

Alibaba is another useful canary in the coalmine for sentiment on the household sector. BABA skeptic Anne Stevenson-Yang recorded a podcast outlining her skepticism of the company. She believes that foreign investors are buying BABA as a proxy for exposure to the Chinese consumer without fully understanding the company. BABA’s accounts are highly opaque, and disclosure selective. As an example, she cited the case of surging sales, but falling margins. This development has never been fully explained, and indicates either some shift in BABA`s business model, or creative accounting by management. The share price of BABA have been falling, and the breach of support at 170 is disconcerting, but the the stock remains in a relative uptrend compared to other A-Shares, which is an indication of continued investor confidence in the Chinese consumer.
 

 

The Smorgasbord Recession verdict

We began this publication with the rhetorical question of whether the market weakness in 2018 is a minor pullback like 2015 or 2011, or something far worse. Is there a smorgasbord recession on the horizon?

The jury is still out on that question.

From a chartist’s perspective, the outlook appears dire. Both global and US equities have flashed long-term sell signals.
 

 

 

On the other hand, the macroeconomic outlook, as well as monetary and trade policy developments remain unclear. While risk levels are rising, they do not justify a recession call yet.

For the last word, I refer readers to the words of Brett Steenbarger at TraderFeed, who wrote the following last Tuesday night at the height of the market selloff:

Yesterday, we saw fewer than 10% of all stocks in the SPX average trading above their three-day moving averages. The market is broadly weak in the short run. Interestingly, when we look at how the SPX stocks are trading relative to their 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, and 200-day moving averages, well fewer than 50% are trading above those benchmarks. So we’re very oversold on a short-term basis in a market that is also oversold on a medium and longer-term basis. (Data from the excellent Index Indicators site).

It turns out that this configuration has occurred 46 times since 2010. Ten days later, the SPX has been up 33 times and down 13 times for an average gain of over +1.63%. Many of the losing instances clustered in the 2011 period when we had some prolonged weakness. Similarly, when we take the data back to 2006, losing instances clustered in 2008/2009, so that there was a positive return over the next day or two from 2006-2009, but actually a negative average return over the following ten days.

So the market is likely to bounce, right? Steenbarger had a more subtle interpretation [emphasis added]:

There is a subtle but important lesson here. The human tendency is to make an assumption about whether we are in a bull or bear market and then extrapolate expectations on that basis. A better use of the data is to recognize that the kind of pullback we’ve seen is historically a very good buying opportunity in all but significant bearish periods. If we do not see a sustained bounce as we walk forward day over day, we can update our thinking to increase the odds that perhaps we’re in the throes of a bear. Conversely, if we see sustained buying, we can question the bear thesis as we walk forward.

In other words, let the market action in the days to come determine the answer of whether there will be a smorgasbord recession ahead.
 

The week ahead

Looking to the week ahead, all of the intermediate term sentiment and technical indicators are screaming “rally imminent”. Let’s start with the sentiment models. The latest update from AAII shows that the bulls have panicked and stampeded over the bear camp.
 

 

Stockcharts has not updated their data, but the bull-bear spread is now -21.8. In the past, such episodes have resolved bullishly, with the exception of the 2008 crash. Even if you believe that this is the start of a bear market, past instances of such bearish excesses saw stock prices rising in 2007.
 

 

The NAAIM Exposure Index, which measures RIA sentiment, fell from 35.1 to 30.6 last week. In the past, the market has shown little downside risk and high upside potential whenever the NAAIM reading has fallen below its 26-week lower Bollinger Band. The previous reading of 35.1 was already below the lower BB, and the latest indicates an even more crowded short extreme.
 

 

In addition, we are seeing positive RSI divergences across a variety of US equity indices. Here is the SPX.
 

 

Here is the NASDAQ Composite.
 

 

Here is the small cap Russell 2000.
 

 

Lastly, here is the broad based Wilshire 5000.
 

 

To be sure, oversold markets can become more oversold. Even if you are bearish, the short-term risk/reward of being short here is not good.
 

 

Risk averse traders who don’t want to take a directional bet may find better relative performance in the mid and small cap stocks with a long mid/small cap and short large cap pair trade.
 

 

My inner investor has been cautious since late August. My inner trader regrets that he was prematurely bullish, but he remains positioned for a rally.

Disclosure: Long SPXL
 

Apple: The new Rorschach test

Posted by Cam Hui -

I normally don’t comment on individual stocks because I don’t have the resources to analyze a zillion companies in detail, but here is a Black Friday thought on Apple, which kicked off a revolution in consumer electronics and created new product categories when it unveiled its iPods, IPads, and iPhones. The share price of Apple have cratered on reports of poor iPhone sales. The chart is a bull’s nightmare. It broke down through the 190 key support level, and violated a long-term uptrend.
 

 

In some ways, AAPL is turning out to be a Rorschach test for investors and traders.
 

Different perspectives on AAPL

Bespoke`s chart depicts the history of the stock’s drawdowns since the inception of the iPhone. Is the current weakness a buying opportunity, or the signs of a busted growth stock that should be sold?
 

 

For a longer term perspective, Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway reported its first purchase of Apple in Q1 2016 when it bought 9.8 million shares. Berkshire has been steadily accumulating Apple shares all the way up, and it now holds roughly 250 million shares. It’s a big bet for Buffett, as the stock represents 26% of the Berkshire portfolio. Buffett initiated his buy program when the stock at its lower weekly Bollinger Band, both on an absolute and market relative basis, which is the same technical position it is in today.
 

 

Is AAPL a buy or a sell? How you answer that question reveals more about yourself than the outlook of the stock.
 

A Thanksgiving Week sector review

Posted by Cam Hui -

Mid-week market update: In light of the US holiday shortened week, I thought I would do one of my periodic sector reviews to analyze both sector leadership and the implications for stock market direction.

As a reminder, Relative Rotation Graphs, or RRG charts, are a way of depicting the changes in leadership in different groups, such as sectors, countries or regions, or market factors. The charts are organized into four quadrants. The typical group rotation pattern occurs in a clockwise fashion. Leading groups (top right) deteriorate to weakening groups (bottom right), which then rotates to lagging groups (bottom left), which changes to improving groups (top left), and finally completes the cycle by improving to leading groups (top right) again.

The latest RRG chart shows the defensive sectors firmly in the lead, while technology, which were the former market darlings, mired in the lagging quadrant.

 

While current leadership provides a useful snapshot of the current market, it does not tell the entire story.

The story of faltering leadership

The main problem with the defensive leadership theme is the consistent trend of faltering leadership. The relative performance charts of each of the defensive sectors are all exhibiting negative RSI divergences, which are warnings of fading momentum. Here is the relative performance chart of Consumer Staples.

 

Here is Heathcare.

 

Here are Utilities against the market.

 

Still not convinced? JPM found that the forward P/E spread between low-volatility stocks, which is a proxy for the defensive parts of the market, and growth stocks is at all-time high. In addition, the median P/E of Utilities (17.9x) is higher than the median P/E of Technology (16.8x) and Communication Services (16.5x).

 

In search of emerging leaders

If defensive stocks are on the verge of giving up their leadership mantle, what will be the emerging leaders? The RRG chart gives us some clues.

One leading candidate are the Financials, which are in the top left “improving” quadrant. However, one key risk is the relative performance of this sector is highly correlated with the shape of the yield curve. These stocks do best when the yield curve is steepening, indicating expectations of better economic growth and a Fed policy that is more dovish than what is currently discounted by the market.

 

Other possible candidates of emerging market leaders are Materials, Energy, and Communication Services, which mostly represent FAANG. Wait, what?

Here are the relative performance charts of these emerging leadership candidates. Material stocks have already rallied through a relative downtrend line and they are turning up.

 

Energy stocks represent another possible new sector leader. The relative performance of European energy, whose market internals tend to be highly correlated to the US market, is much better than US energy.

 

Finally, we have Communication Services, which are exhibiting a positive RSI divergence.

 

A W-shaped bottom

In conclusion, the picture of faltering defensive leadership is highly suggestive of an imminent rebound in stock prices. I wrote last weekend (see What is Mr. Market saying about Powell’s global slowdown?) that sentiment was becoming excessively bearish, which is contrarian bullish. The combination of panicked RIAs, as evidenced by the latest NAAIM Exposure Index, a tanking Fear and Greed Index, and elevated put/call ratios all point to a market bottom.

The SPX is exhibiting bullish divergence as it tests the October lows. We are seeing positive RSI divergences, the VIX Index cannot exceed its October highs, and the VIX term structure is now inverted, indicating fear.

 

Panic is now in the air, as evidence by these headlines from the Drudge Report.

 

In addition, the NYSE McClellan Summation Index (NYSI) is starting to turn up from an oversold condition. There have been 18 instances in the past 12 years when that has happened. In only three of those occasions have the market continued to decline (red vertical lines). (Note that the study period includes the market peak of 2007 and the subsequent bear market.)

 

My inner investor has already turned cautious because the primary trend is down. On the other hand, my inner trader remains bullish. He believe that you shouldn`t get overwhelmed by the emotion of the moment. Play the odds.

Disclosure: Long SPXL

What is Mr. Market saying about Powell’s “global slowdown”?

Posted by Cam Hui -

Preface: Explaining our market timing models
We maintain several market timing models, each with differing time horizons. The “Ultimate Market Timing Model” is a long-term market timing model based on the research outlined in our post, Building the ultimate market timing model. This model tends to generate only a handful of signals each decade.

The Trend Model is an asset allocation model which applies trend following principles based on the inputs of global stock and commodity price. This model has a shorter time horizon and tends to turn over about 4-6 times a year. In essence, it seeks to answer the question, “Is the trend in the global economy expansion (bullish) or contraction (bearish)?”
 

 

My inner trader uses the trading component of the Trend Model to look for changes in the direction of the main Trend Model signal. A bullish Trend Model signal that gets less bullish is a trading “sell” signal. Conversely, a bearish Trend Model signal that gets less bearish is a trading “buy” signal. The history of actual out-of-sample (not backtested) signals of the trading model are shown by the arrows in the chart below. The turnover rate of the trading model is high, and it has varied between 150% to 200% per month.

Subscribers receive real-time alerts of model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts are updated weekly here. The hypothetical trading record of the trading model of the real-time alerts that began in March 2016 is shown below.
 

 

The latest signals of each model are as follows:

  • Ultimate market timing model: Buy equities
  • Trend Model signal: Bearish
  • Trading model: Bullish

Update schedule: I generally update model readings on my site on weekends and tweet mid-week observations at @humblestudent. Subscribers receive real-time alerts of trading model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts is shown here.
 

Global slowdown?

In a speech last week, Fed chair Jay Powell stated that while the American economy was performing well, he raised concerns about the effects of a global slowdown. His remarks highlights the importance of non-US markets, and it would be useful to take a brief tour around the world to see what Mr. Market thinks of the “global slowdown”.

A comparison of global equity market (top panel) and US equities (middle panel) shows some differences and similarities.
 

 

We can make a number of observations from this chart:

  • Both global and US equities are in downtrends, defined as each index trading below its 200 day moving average (dma), but US stocks are stronger as the SPX is only just below its 200 dma.
  • Both indices are forming possible inverse head and shoulders formations which may resolve bullishly. As good technicians know, these patterns are not confirmed until the neckline breaks. 
  • One key difference stands out if upside breakouts were to occur. The measured upside target for global stocks is below the January all-time highs, while the measured target for the SPX is over 3000, which would represent a fresh high for that index.
  • Market leadership may be pausing and waiting for direction. The bottom panel shows that for much of this year, US stocks have been outperforming global stocks, as measured by the MSCI All-Country World Index (ACWI), but relative performance of US, EAFE, and EM equities have flattened out since September. 

What follows is a more detailed review of global markets as we take a quick tour around the world.
 

Inverse head and shoulders everywhere

Let’s begin in Europe. The chart of the Euro STOXX 50 and key core European markets are all in downtrends but displaying similar possible inverse head and shoulders patterns. There are some exceptions, such as Italy and Greece, which are not recovering as strongly , reflecting the special situations that these countries face within the eurozone.
 

 

Across the English Channel, the chart below of UK stocks, as measured by the FTSE 100 and smaller cap FTSE 250 tell the story of the special situation in that country. The FTSE 100, which is composed of large cap companies with global reach, is exhibiting a possible inverse head and shoulders pattern typical of other global indices. However, the FTSE 250, which is composed of smaller companies more sensitive to the UK economy, broke down below its February lows, which is reflective of the market angst over the uncertainties of Brexit.
 

 

Over in Asia, the stock indices of China’s major Asian trading partners reveal similar downtrends but patterns of nascent inverse head and shoulders formations. The Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Australian markets are all exhibiting these patterns in some form. The Shanghai market is an exception, but it seems to be trying to stabilize.
 

 

Signs of China weakness

What about oil prices, which have recently cratered? A glance at the price of oil and commodity prices tell a different story.
 

 

We can make the following observations from the above chart:

  • Oil prices were only playing catch-up to commodity price weakness. Non-oil commodities are all resting at key support levels, while oil prices have been on a tear since the summer of 2017. The commodity complex (CRB, second panel), the cyclically sensitive industrial metals (third panel), and gold (fourth panel) have been weak for over a year.
  • The oil to commodity ratio recently broke a relative uptrend (fifth panel), but the ratio remains well above the levels from which it began its bull run.
  • Commodity weakness is attributable to weakness in China. The bottom panel shows the relative performance of the China Materials ETF (CHIM) against the Global Materials ETF (MXI). The ratio has been range bound after weakening from early 2018 until July, and it is testing a key relative support level that stretches back to December 2016. This is indicative of a lack of enthusiasm for Chinese raw material stocks, which is a signal of weak Chinese commodity demand.

Chinese weakness can also be observed from the relative performance of EM stocks against ACWI. As the chart below shows, EM equities have broken out of a downtrend against ACWI (top panel). However, positive relative strength can be found everywhere except for China. While Chinese stocks are roughly flat against ACWI (second panel), relative strength is evident in the other EM regions, including the oil price sensitive Russia (bottom panel).
 

 

I suggested in a recent publication (see Was the market swoon made in China?) that much of the future market direction depends on China. This brief tour around the world indicates that may still be the case. Under those circumstances, expect further volatility based on newsflow on US-China trade negotiations.
 

A tactical rally ahead?

That said, the widespread appearance of the possible but incomplete inverse head and shoulders pattern in many global indices suggests that stock prices may be in for a year-end rally (see Time to position for a year-end rally?).

In addition to the sentiment indicators I cited in that post, the NAAIM Exposure Index, which measures the equity sentiment of RIAs, has fallen below its 26-week Bollinger Band indicating excessive bearishness. Historically, such episodes have seen equity prices rise shortly afterwards.
 

 

The Fear and Greed Index stands at 10, and these levels are consistent with readings seen at previous complex W-shaped bottoms.
 

 

The 21 dma of the CBOE put/call ratio is at levels consistent with past tradable bottoms.
 

 

These are all strongly indicative of a stock market rebound lasting until year-end and possibly into January. However, I would not overstay the party. Global markets are all in downtrends, defined as trading below their 200 dma, and the DJ Global Index saw a MACD sell signal on the monthly chart in July. I would therefore expect lower prices after a brief relief rally.
 

 

The week ahead

Looking to the holiday shortened week ahead, the SPX is poised to begin its year-end rally. The initial objective will be the neckline of the potential inverse head and shoulders formation at about 2820. Momentum is favorable as the index has exhibited a positive RSI divergence. However, if the market were to surge to test 2820 resistance next week, the rally is likely to fail as the VIX Index would probably fall below its lower BB, which would be the sign of an overbought market.
 

 

I would warn that the year-end rally may face some fundamental headwinds. The latest update from FactSet shows that EPS estimate revisions may be stalling. Forward 12-month EPS edged up an estimated 0.01% in the latest week after -0.12% the previous week, which may be a sign that of flagging fundamental momentum. On the other hand, the lack of upward EPS revisions may be a residual effect of the recent stock market weakness, as forward EPS has shown itself to be coincident with stock prices, and its weakness only serves as a fundamental signal of market strength or weakness.
 

 

Short-term breadth indicators are coming off an oversold reading and exhibiting positive momentum, which is bullish. I will be watching this next week to see if it reaches an overbought level.
 

 

For the last word, I refer you to Jesse Felder. Felder found not one, but two possible head and shoulders formations in the hourly SPX chart. One breaks upwards, and the other breaks downwards. While he characterized it as a Rorschbach test for traders, it also represents an important lesson for technicians. These patterns are not complete until the neckline breaks, so be prepared.
 

 

My inner investor remains cautious, and his equity weight is near his minimum risk level. My inner trader covered his shorts last Thursday and went long in anticipation of the start of a seasonal rally.

Disclosure: Long SPXL
 

Time to position for a year-end rally?

Posted by Cam Hui -

Mid-week market update: Even as stock prices weakened this week, the market appears to be setting up for a year-end rally. The SPX is exhibiting a number of positive divergences. Both the NYSE and NASDAQ new lows are not spiking even as stock prices have fallen. In addition, the percentage of stocks above their 50 day moving averages (dma) are making a series of higher lows, which are all bullish.
 

 

What are the risks and opportunities in positioning for a year-end rally?
 

The bull case

The tactical bull case is relatively easy to make. Sentiment is becoming washed-out. The latest Investors Intelligence bull-bear spread is at levels seen in recent intermediate bottoms.
 

 

SentimenTrader also observed that Rydex traders are panicking, which is contrarian bullish.
 

 

I recently highlighted analysis from Mark Hulbert which indicated that market timers have become excessively bearish, which is contrarian bullish. Hulbert wrote that these readings create an equity bullish environment for the next couple of months, which is consistent with the year-end rally theme.

Contrarian analysis isn’t always right, and even when it is it only applies to the short term — no more than the next month or two. So today’s encouraging sentiment picture tells us nothing about where the market might be six months to year from now.

But, for now at least, contrarians are betting that the stock market will higher over the next couple of months.

 

I also pointed out that we have seen a cluster of corporate insider buying. Even if you are bearish longer term, which I am, such signals resolved themselves with short-term rallies during the period after the 2007 market peak.
 

 

Don`t get too bullish

Should a rally into year-end materialize, I would refrain from becoming overly bullish for a number of reasons. First, investors have to contend with the long-term sell signal flashed by the combination of negative monthly RSI divergence and MACD sell signal.
 

 

In addition, the market has been reacting to news from China (see Assessing the odds of a US-China agreement). Despite the encouraging signals, it is difficult to believe that any substantive agreement can come out of the Trump-Xi meeting in Argentina at the sidelines of the G20 summit November 30 – December 1. Be prepared for disappointment.
 

Two tests for the bulls

Nevertheless, the stock market is poised for a relief rally from a technical and sentiment perspective. There is an inverse head and shoulders formation that is forming in the SPX. Good technicians know that these formations are not confirmed until the neckline breaks. If the index were to break through neckline resistance, the measured target would be about 3035, and such an event would likely spark an initial but brief FOMO rally.
 

 

Hold your enthusiasm. Here are some challenges for the bulls. First, the longer term weekly chart shows that the SPX broke down through an uptrend. While the market kissed the underside of the trend line last week, it did not break through on a closing basis. One of the key tasks for the bulls will be to break up through the trend line, otherwise any year-end rally would be interpreted as a failed backtest and likely fizzle out with a lower high.
 

 

In addition, watch for breadth thrusts. Past rallies have seen breadth thrusts (circled), as measured by the new high-new low % indicators, in one or more of large caps, midcaps, small caps, or NASDAQ stocks.
 

 

If the bulls cannot pass these two simple tests, then any upside breakout of the inverse head and shoulders is likely to be disappointing. Rallies will either be weak, abbreviated, or both.

Subscribers received an email alert today that my inner trader had covered his short positions and flipped to long.

Disclosure: Long SPXL
 

Assessing the odds of a US-China agreement

Posted by Cam Hui -

In the past week, a number of readers have expressed the conviction that US-China trade tensions are likely to ease in the near future at the upcoming Trump-Xi meeting, which will occur at the sidelines of the G20 meeting November 30-December  Bloomberg reported that American farmers are so hopeful that they are storing significant amounts of their soy crop for future sale. What are the odds that will happen?

Certainly, there are some signs of a thaw. The strength of the USD Index indicates that there is more room for CNYUSD to decline further. But the PBOC dropped a pledge to allow the market to play a larger role in setting the exchange rate in its latest quarterly monetary report, which is a signal that the central bank is prepared to intervene to cushion yuan weakness.
 

 

While the steps taken by the PBOC is a useful start, here are the challenges facing an agreement on a trade deal.
 

Devaluation or capital flight?

One of the sources of friction during the trade war is the exchange rate level. Fretting over CNYUSD may not be useful in the current environment. A recent IMF paper, Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs, found that tariffs don’t work because the exchange rate devalues to adjust for the effects of tariffs.

We study the macroeconomic consequences of tariffs. We estimate impulse response functions from local projections using a panel of annual data that spans 151 countries over 1963‐2014. We find that tariff increases lead, in the medium term, to economically and statistically significant declines in domestic output and productivity. Tariff increases also result in more unemployment, higher inequality, and real exchange rate appreciation, but only small effects on the trade balance. The effects on output and productivity tend to be magnified when tariffs rise during expansions, for advanced economies, and when tariffs go up, not down. Our results are robust to a large number of perturbations to our methodology, and we complement our analysis with industry‐level data.

Everything else being equal, the Chinese yuan would naturally fall to adjust for the effects of the Trump tariffs. Indeed, there is a considerable interest rate divergence between the US and China, which puts downward pressure on the exchange rate.
 

 

Benn Steil at the Center for Foreign Relations pointed out that the poor performance of Chinese equities puts additional downward pressure on CNYUSD.

Over the past two years, as our left-hand figure above shows, foreign portfolio investors have piled prodigiously into Chinese assets, helping to support the RMB. But history suggests this trend is about to reverse. While inflows have been rising, Chinese stocks have been tumbling—they are down over 20 percent from their January peak. Dreadful performance like this typically drives funds out of emerging markets. We may be seeing the beginning of such outflows in China.

 

Steil concluded with an ominous warning for Beijing should it decide to prop up its currency:

So in spite of President’s Trump’s repeated charges that China is manipulating its currency for competitive advantage in trade, all evidence suggests that it will continue to do the opposite. But if China were to sell reserves at the same pace as in 2015, its reserve levels would, by mid-2020, actually fall below the safety threshold implied by the IMF’s framework for reserve adequacy—as shown in the right-hand figure above.

The prospect of a balance-of-payments crisis, in which China would struggle to pay for imports and service foreign debt (a prospect considered outlandish a decade ago), highlights the urgency with which China must begin addressing the problem of high and rising corporate and local-government debt levels. The PBoC has no easy fix for these problems.

In the meantime, capital flows are continuing, albeit at a reduced rate, even before the deletion of the PBOC’s to allow the market to play a larger role in the exchange rate.
 

 

If the Chinese decide to prop up its exchange rate, it will have to choose between a market driven devaluation, or capital flows.
 

Preparing for the Trump-Xi summit

Ahead of the Trump-Xi meeting in Buenos Ares, here is what each side had to say. Bloomberg reported that Xi Jinping criticized “law of jungle” in veiled swipe at Trump at the inaugural China International Import Expo on Monday that “the practices of beggar-thy-neighbor” would lead to global stagnation.

Marc Chandler outlined the American position this way:

In a recent article in the Wall Street Journal, former Treasury Secretary Paulson seemed to express the views of many. If neither the US nor China changes its course, an “iron curtain may soon descend.” Pssst…the future has happened.

It can be debated when the Rubicon was crossed. Perhaps it was when Chinese officials had thought a deal had been struck with Treasury Secretary Mnuchin to buy more US goods to reduce its bilateral surplus with the US, only for President Trump to have torpedoed the agreement. That taught China that power does not lie with the US Treasury. Chinese officials also took that to mean that issue was not really the bilateral imbalance, but part of a larger attempt to stymie China’s rise. The Rubicon has been crossed.

Trump’s speech a couple of months ago should have left no doubt about what is happening: “When I came we were heading in a certain direction that was going to allow China to be bigger than us in a very short period of time. That is not going to happen anymore.”

Vice-President Pence was crystal clear in a recent speech. China was trying to shape the world in ways that are contrary to the US values and interests. Past administrations that sought to integrate China into the US-led order, like Paulson, in effect were co-conspirators to the violations of the rules to the detriment of America. Pence claimed that China was interfering with domestic policies. This is a strong claim.

Chandler took the gloves off in outlining the issues in this trade conflict:

Let’s be frank. Even before the Trump’s election, some Chinese officials thought that the US was trying to contain the PRC’s rise. It may or may not have been the case previously, but there can be little mistake now. The US is not just preparing for a fissure, it is fostering it.

NAFTA 2.0 is not much different than NAFTA 1.0 plus some of the measures agreed to in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations and some domestic content changes. It also contained two other modifications, which mean very little for Canada and Mexico, but significant as a template for future agreements. The first is about intervention in the foreign exchange market and making it transparent and rare. The second is the gem. It essentially says that having trade agreements with non-market economies can end the bilateral deal with the US. “Non-market economies” is diplomatic-speak for China.

It can force countries who want privileged access to the US market to limit their trade with countries it judges unfit. Paulson fears that the US will be isolated because few will want to be locked out of the rapid growth that China continues to enjoy, even if not as fast as a few years ago. This seems to be an expression of defeatism among many of globalist camp.

Ahead of the summit, Xinhua reported that Xi Jinping met foreign policy guru Henry Kissinger. Xi stated after the meeting:

Adhering to the path of peaceful development, China remains committed to developing Sino-U.S. relations featuring non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation. We are willing to properly resolve the problems between the two countries through friendly consultations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. At the same time, the U.S. side should also respect China’s right to choose its own way of development and China’s legitimate interests. [The United States should] walk along with China to jointly safeguard the healthy and stable development of Sino-U.S. relations.

Kissinger responded:

Under the current situation, U.S.-China cooperation is crucial to world peace and prosperity. I highly appreciate China’s efforts… The United States and China must better understand each other, strengthen strategic communication, continuously expand common interests, properly manage differences, and show the world that the common interests of the two countries are far greater than the differences.

Translation: Xi met Kissinger because of his reputation for strategic realism. Xi’s message to the old foreign policy warhorse is China is willing to sacrifice some of China’s interests, as long as it doesn’t harm Beijing’s long-term development strategy.

Is there enough daylight between the two sides for some kind of agreement? Marc Chandler doesn’t think so:

China initially appeared content to bide its time and Xi is positioned to outlast Trump. It tried offering concessions to ease the bilateral imbalance. These were ultimately rebuffed. The rhetoric on both sides has become more hostile. China has few friends in the US. Environmentalists, labor, human rights activists, businesses frustrated with the discrimination, and nationalists (President Trump’s self-identification) are vocally critical. Antipathy toward China is one of the few bipartisan issues in America, where the electorate and officials are exceptionally polarized. Democrats, who were often criticized by Republicans for being “soft on Communism” after the Kennedy-Johnson era, are not going to be similarly vulnerable in this new cold war.

This means that Chinese officials cannot in anyway count on the changes of the US electoral cycle to dial back the confrontation. While many in the US see a contradiction between China modernizing economy and an archaic political system, China experiences US government as unstable.

Consider that the US impeached one president who lied about a having slept with a consenting woman while electing another man president who appeared to have bragged about taking advantage of other women. Or consider that US political elite had sponsored a multilateral system of free mobility of goods and capital, but in one election in which the winner did not receive a majority of the popular vote, the strategy has been turned on its head. The vagaries of America’s electoral system and the gerrymandering that helps preserve it is not a stable foundation upon which China’s development strategy can reliably depend.

He concluded:

The situation is likely to get worse in the period ahead. It seems unlikely that China will make the concessions the US is looking for later this month when Trump and Xi meet. Trump then is likely to begin the formal process of putting tariffs on the remainder of Chinese goods. That process will take a couple of months and could be halted or modified before implementation, but in the meantime, it is consistent with the maximum pressure tactics the Art of the Deal requires. Moreover, on January 1, the 10% tariff on $200 bln of Chinese goods will be raised to 25%.

I agree. Both sides are dug in. It is difficult to see how either could back down given their respective positions. In particular, it will be difficult for Trump to conclude a NAFTA 2.0 style deal and “declare victory” without accusations of having caved to the Chinese.

Prepare for a minor risk-on rally on the hopes of a thaw ahead of the summit, and disappointment afterwards.
 

Insiders are buying, should you jump into stocks?

Posted by Cam Hui -

Preface: Explaining our market timing models
We maintain several market timing models, each with differing time horizons. The “Ultimate Market Timing Model” is a long-term market timing model based on the research outlined in our post, Building the ultimate market timing model. This model tends to generate only a handful of signals each decade.

The Trend Model is an asset allocation model which applies trend following principles based on the inputs of global stock and commodity price. This model has a shorter time horizon and tends to turn over about 4-6 times a year. In essence, it seeks to answer the question, “Is the trend in the global economy expansion (bullish) or contraction (bearish)?”

 

My inner trader uses the trading component of the Trend Model to look for changes in the direction of the main Trend Model signal. A bullish Trend Model signal that gets less bullish is a trading “sell” signal. Conversely, a bearish Trend Model signal that gets less bearish is a trading “buy” signal. The history of actual out-of-sample (not backtested) signals of the trading model are shown by the arrows in the chart below. The turnover rate of the trading model is high, and it has varied between 150% to 200% per month.

Subscribers receive real-time alerts of model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts are updated weekly here. The hypothetical trading record of the trading model of the real-time alerts that began in March 2016 is shown below.

 

The latest signals of each model are as follows:

  • Ultimate market timing model: Buy equities
  • Trend Model signal: Bearish
  • Trading model: Bearish

Update schedule: I generally update model readings on my site on weekends and tweet mid-week observations at @humblestudent. Subscribers receive real-time alerts of trading model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts is shown here.

Insiders are buying

Regular readers will know that I have been sounding cautionary technical warnings because of a negative monthly RSI divergence and a MACD sell signal for US equities. This combination has been uncanny in the past at warning of major market tops.

 

On the other hand, the latest report from Open Insider shows that corporate insiders, who are known as “smart investors”, have been buying the latest dip. Historically, sales (red line) exceed buys (blue line) by a significant margin. A funny thing happened during the latest correction. Sales dried up, and buys exceeded sales, which is an indication that insiders are showing confidence in the share price outlook of their own companies.

 

How can we square the circle of these two contradictory signals? Should investors be buying or selling equities?

The valuation bull case

Here is how corporate insiders are probably seeing the market. Simply put, valuations are attractive. The latest update from FactSet shows that the market is trading an undemanding forward P/E ratio of 16.0, which is below the 5-year average of 16.5, and above the 10-year average of 14.5.

 

From that point of view, the recent price dip was a gift from the market gods. Stock prices just went on sale. Why shouldn’t insiders be buying?

What are the risks?

As a group, insiders are generally known to have better knowledge about their companies and the industry conditions their companies operate in, they are not always prescient about the future. As an example, we saw several clusters of insider buying on dips after the market top in 2007. In fact, insiders were buying all the way down to the 2009 bottom.

 

I believe that the bullish signal from insider buying should be offset by the risks of rising economic policy uncertainty.

 

The bear case

Here is the bear case to the valuation thesis. What if conditions changed sufficiently that tanked earnings? I offer two possible scenarios.

First, the US and China appear to be headed towards a full-blown trade war. In the past, recessions have caused world exports to fall. Could the tail wag the dog this time? Could falling global trade cause a recession, and a decline in earnings expectations?

 

The IMF has estimated that a full-blown trade war would reduce US real GDP growth by about 1%. China’s GDP would fall by 1.6%, and the rest of Asia would also get sideswiped by trade tensions.

 

The latest FOMC Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) shows that the median estimate of real GDP growth is 2.5% in 2019 and 2.0% in 2020. If IMF projections are correct, then we could see those figures fall to 1.5% and 1.0% respectively.

 

Indeed, the Fed is projecting already a significant slowdown in 2021, as the unemployment rate rises 0.2% from 3.5% in 2020 to 3.7% in 2121. The 0.2% rise in unemployment is very close to the recession threshold outlined by the (then) New York Fed president Bill Dudley who observed that the economy fell into recession whenever the unemployment rate rose more than 0.3% to 0.4%,

A particular risk of late and fast is that the unemployment rate could significantly undershoot the level consistent with price stability. If this occurred, then inflation would likely rise above our objective. At that point, history shows it is very difficult to push the unemployment rate back up just a little bit in order to contain inflation pressures. Looking at the post-war period, whenever the unemployment rate has increased by more than 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points, the economy has always ended up in a full-blown recession with the unemployment rate rising by at least 1.9 percentage points.

What’s the downside risk under such a scenario? Supposing we were to pencil in a 10-20% fall in EPS estimates from a trade war. In the past, forward P/E ratios have experienced compression during economic slowdowns.

 

History shows the minimum forward P/E compression has been 2-3 points, and it has been considerably higher during more severe recessions. However, I don’t believe that P/E ratios are likely to fall very much, as institutional investors have largely already de-risked their portfolios. Assuming that forward P/E ratios fall by 2-3 points, and estimates decline by 10-20%, equity downside risk is 20-30%.

 

What if matters were to get worse? The Fed has made it clear that it is embarked on a slow but steady rate normalization policy. There has been no discussion of when it might pause its rate hikes, and many analysts have concluded that the Fed will continue to raise until something breaks. What if the Fed were to make such a policy mistake and react too slowly to signs of a slowdown?

Since the effects of monetary policy operate with a lag, the 2020 SEP median GDP growth rate of 1.0% under the IMF’s trade war scenario is at risk of turning negative. Already, cyclically sensitive industries such as housing appears to be peaking out. In the past, growth has slowed whenever housing inventory has spiked. Will the current episode tip the economy into recession?

 

Monetary indicators, such as real money growth, are decelerating and on the verge of turning negative, which would represent another recession warning.

 

The price downside risk for equities under the conditions of a double whammy of a Fed policy error and full-blown trade war would be considerably more than 20-30%.

Resolving the macro and technical outlook

So how can we resolve the apparent bullish outlook shown by corporate insiders and the poor technical outlook shown by the charts? Here is what the market is saying.

The monthly MACD sell signal for US equities is actually late. World equities already flashed a MACD sell signal in July. Non-US stock markets have been discounting a global slowdown for several months.

 

The message from the market is, “We are worried about policy risk.”

Here is what I would watch for. I recently wrote about the rise of recession risk (see A recession in 2020?). While my long leading indicators are not flashing red, they are flickering. Investors need to monitor the evolution of recession risk.

In conjunction with conventional macroeconomic analysis, we also need to pay attention to global growth risks posed by rising trade tensions. Should the US impose a further round of tariffs on Chinese imports in January, the anticipated effects will be far more consequential to US growth than the previous round because the new tariffs will be on intermediate goods, which are production inputs into American products. A new IMF paper, Macroeconomic Effects of Tariffs, shows the negative effects on economic output and productivity if tariffs are imposed on inputs (top panels) compared to outputs (bottom panels).

 

In addition to any progress between the scheduled Xi-Trump talks at the G20 meeting in late November, investors may be well-served to monitor any changes in the Trump administration during the post-election period. Cabinet secretaries and administration officials often turn over after the midterms. For example, if Steve Mnuchin at Treasury or Wilbur Ross at Commerce were to leave, but the Peter Navarro and Robert Lightizer were to stay, it would signal a more protectionist turn in American policy. In a late breaking development, CNBC reported Friday that Trump is considering replacing Wilbur Ross with former WWE executive Linda McMahon as Commerce Secretary by the end of the year.

As I pointed out in the past (see Was the market swoon made in China?), the effects of the Trump tariffs are just starting to show up in Q4. If there is no further progress in the trade talks, more sanctions will hit the Chinese economy starting January 1, 2019.

In conclusion, while corporate insider buying presents a possible opportunity to buy stocks, the valuation appeal of stocks is offset by the risks of macro policy uncertainty. Investors should assess recession risk, and the evolution of the Sino-American trade policy risk before following the risk-on policy adopted by corporate insiders.

The week ahead: Waiting for clarity

In my last post (see Bullish or bearish? What’s your time horizon?), I wrote that the market appears to be undergoing a bottoming pattern. However, it is unclear whether a final bottom has been made. We should get more clarity in the week ahead. Intermediate sentiment such as the normalized equity-only put/call ratio indicates a market that is poised to rally.

 

Mark Hulbert also pointed out that his survey of market timers are more bearish than they were at the February bottom, which is contrarian bullish.

 

As well, an examination of the 4-8 week market reaction to insider buying clusters during the 2007 top shows that the market has tended to rally after such episodes. Even if you believe that the top is in, you should still expect a reflex rally.

 

If the stock market were to strengthen, the challenge facing the bulls is to break uptrend resistance after its violation.

 

However, a number of indicators suggest that stocks may have to decline first before prices can rally in a sustainable manner. The latest update from FactSet was somewhat disturbing. Despite the above average results from Q3 earnings season, forward 12-month EPS fell last week. As forward EPS estimates are coincidental with stock prices, it is unclear whether this is just a data blip or something more concerning.

 

Further analysis shows that the decline in forward EPS was attributable to cuts to 2019 earnings. 2018 EPS estimates remain steady. If this trend of 2019 downgrades continues into next week, the market may be spooked by the outlook for next year.

 

Traders should also watch the USD. While this is not a perfect relationship, USD rallies in the past year have coincided with stock market weakness. The USD Index bounced off trend line support last week and it is advancing. If recent history is any guide, this should translate into further equity weakness.

 

The post-election rally last Wednesday qualified as an Investors Business Daily Follow Through Day (FTD), which is evidence of a breadth thrust. Such breadth thrusts are interpreted to be bullish, but Rob Hanna`s study of FTD found only a success rate of 55% after such episodes. As a reference, the market tends to rise 56% of the time on a weekly time frame, and 61% of the time monthly. Therefore a 55% success rate is nothing to get overly excited about.

Last week’s SPX rally stalled at a key Fibonacci retracement level, and ended the week with two unfilled gaps below. Whether the gaps get filled is an open question. What is constructive is the index closed about its 200 day moving average (dma). However, the equal-weighted SPX was unable to rally above its 200 dma, which represents a minor negative breadth divergence.

 

Short-term breadth market indicators is retreating from an overbought reading, which is a classic sell signal for traders. I am inclined to wait for this indicator to fall to at least a mild oversold condition before reversing to the long side.

 

My inner investor has de-risked his portfolio and he is at his minimum equity weight. My inner trader was caught short during last week’s rally, but he remains short in anticipation of lower prices next week. He will re-evaluate his positioning once he gets greater clarity from next week’s market action.

Disclosure: Long SPXU